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In Search of the Qualitative Clear Majority: Democratic 
Experimentalism and the Quebec Secession Reference 
 
Cristie L. Ford 
 
I produced an earlier version of this article while studying at Columbia Law School, and a 
number of people have contributed to its development. I am particularly grateful to James 
Liebman, Charles Sabel, and Mark Tushnet for their exceptionally helpful comments. 
I. A BLUE-SKY STORY 
Picture this: the second most populous region in an affluent federal 
democracy is thinking about seceding from the rest of that country. The 
regional government has held two referendums on secession in the span of a 
generation. In both cases the results were very close, and the population 
remains divided on this emotional issue. An appeal is taken to the highest 
federal court on the question of what would be required for the region to 
secede legally under the federation's constitution, but the court's reply does 
not rein in the debate. The court talks about the traditions of the country and 
the way such decisions are made. It sets out the country's four deepest 
constitutional values: democracy, federalism, constitutionalism and the rule 
of law, and respect for minorities. It answers, quite simply, that any region 
that wants to leave the federation must honour these values and must 
demonstrate that a "qualitative" and "clear" majority of its people actually 
want to secede. Then, the court throws the question back to the political 
arena. Years pass while the federal and regional governments stake out 
their positions through strategic statutes, all the while trying to get on with 
the daily business of government. Existing political solutions seem too puny 
to tackle the task. Faith in elected political representatives reaches a deep 
low. Citizens grow ever more disenchanted, and they withdraw from even 
trying to resolve a dilemma that seems so complicated and impossible. 
Uneasy silence falls. 
In a decentralized and globalizing world, discontented minorities within 
a single nationstate, often with longstanding grievances and a historical 
sense of nationhood, are not uncommon. The questions they face are hard 
ones that go to the very roots of their identities. This region is no exception. 
It has long been performing a difficult three-part balancing act between the 
need to ensure the survival of its own distinct culture in a the midst of a 
different surrounding cultural and linguistic environment; the need to 
protect its economic and social well-being in an increasingly interconnected 
global community; and the need to recognize and respect its own internal 
diversity. In many respects, its internal struggle over secession is only part 
of a larger social uncertainty over how the region sees itself and where it 
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wants to go. Thus the issue refuses to fade away, in spite of the population's 
weariness. 
Then comes the change: this region's people--incrementally at first, and 
then in a more conscious and organized fashion--take matters into their own 
hands. Their starting point is that the options put before them by the 
political system are unsatisfactory--neither total separation nor the status 
quo will heal the divisions they are so keenly aware of in their own 
communities. Drawing on their own experiences, local groups begin to talk 
about their region's relationship to the rest of the country in a fresh way, 
looking at the assumptions they have about what is possible and challenging 
the rigid options that their governments--regional and federal--have set 
before them. They talk about foreign relations, the national debt, Aboriginal 
peoples, the environment. They talk about the elements set out in the 
Secession Reference--the four pillars of national constitutional tradition 
that describe what it would take for the region to secede legally from the 
enveloping state. They talk about federalism, secession, globalization, 
history, and the future. 
 The groups face great challenges and frustrations along the way and 
many of them dissipate. Faced with the lack of other alternatives, however, 
and tired of the chronic low-level dysfunction in their own communities, 
some return to the table to brainstorm about how to make their 
deliberations work. They look at the process they are engaged in, reflecting 
on the successes and challenges of getting people to agree and to stay 
involved. Individuals in the community with experience in conflict resolution 
and strategic planning are drawn in. They identify stakeholders, key players, 
issues and concerns, and they set timelines. They develop a strategic plan 
and set goals for themselves. This time, rather than focusing on large 
theoretical questions about governance, the groups try to look at concrete 
examples of how the sovereignty debate and its attendant policies--in 
education, immigration, language rights, business regulation--affect 
interactions in their own community. As the discussion proceeds, it becomes 
unavoidably obvious that questions about language, identity, and culture 
cannot be contained within the abstract world of formal politics; in 
complicated and immediate ways, they spill over into the personal, 
cognitive, social, economic, and local realms. New stakeholders emerge and 
the community seems more diverse than ever. Simply because they have no 
choice, the discussion groups proceed in small, knowable steps. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, progress is made. Participants--even those 
from very different perspectives--find that they can agree on quite a lot 
when they break things down into concrete issues, draw on their own 
experiences, listen carefully to others' perspectives, and challenge rigid 
either/or presentations. By chipping away at problem areas, new and 
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unanticipated bands of agreement between groups are located, which in 
turn suggest new avenues of exploration. Thorny issues are approached 
from different angles. The groups learn that having a diversity of 
perspectives represented in their discussions demonstrably improves 
outcomes (in terms of reaching workable accommodations) because it 
enlarges the range of options on the table and opens up new ways of 
thinking about old stalemates. Partly in response to that discovery and 
partly out of a sense of fairness, they try to ensure that all the interests in 
their communities have a place at the table. Yet it also becomes clear that 
existing identifiable groups in the neighborhood (the business community, 
cultural minorities, the linguistic majority, the unemployed) are not at all 
monolithic, and they cannot be represented in essentialist, collective terms 
on every issue. The groups find that hiving social or personal issues from 
political ones is both unrealistic and counterproductive in an interconnected 
local community, and they struggle to manage as much as they can. They 
discover that the very act of respectful, open-minded conversation has value 
in itself as a means of building social agreement. And they discover that 
their own experience, rather than deference to others' authority or expertise, 
is the best guide to building agreement in their own community. Some 
groups track their successes, and some cynics begin to keep half an eye on 
the goings-on. 
Local groups start to talk to each other. They pool information and 
compare notes on their substantive agreements and on processes that led to 
success in breaking stalemates and keeping the process functioning. In spite 
of the range of individual issues on their tables, the groups identify some 
common reference points and comparable experiences. An Internet library 
and "clearing house" develops. It starts to maintain a database of the 
groups' experiences with resolving disputes, managing participation, 
representing different community interests, and planning strategically. It 
disseminates success stories and publicly recognizes breakthroughs in 
negotiations. People even become curious about the experiences of other 
nations in managing diversity and democracy, to be used as raw material 
for sifting through the discursive process. High-performing localities draw 
on this aggregate information to improve their own processes and further 
their own deliberations. 
Somewhere along the way, to everyone's surprise, it starts to look as 
though this network of piecemeal local experiments may aggregate into 
something noteworthy. A snapshot of the public mood emerges--grainy, but 
promising. The region's citizens begin to identify degrees of agreement on 
aspects of a new arrangement with the rest of the country. Blunter 
instruments for measuring public opinion--yes/no referendums, single issue 
election votes--appear divisive and unsatisfactory by comparison. Wild-eyed 
optimists even speculate about the possibility of creating a more 
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participatory and legitimate form of democratic governance based on the 
local experiments. 
It is at this point that people need to get serious: they need to move from 
feel-good but relatively ineffective and disjointed community-based 
deliberations to something more rigorous. A second crucial event occurs--a 
crisis of some kind, perhaps--and suddenly it is obvious that the region 
needs to get on with the business of its future and take some truly 
meaningful steps toward change. 
Drawing on lessons learned in the country's public sector over the last 
ten years, the Internet clearing house starts to monitor the local groups and 
compare their success in terms of the quality of their process. It develops 
general procedural guidelines to ensure that the local bodies use strategic 
planning tools, observe and develop "rolling" best practices standards for 
participation and decision making, and maintain essential informational 
resources. A preliminary "Members' Code of Conduct" is drafted to 
entrench the values of transparency, accountability, accessibility and broad 
participation, and respectful dialogue in the local debates. As a crucial 
element of good procedure, groups are required to give reasons for their 
decisions. The clearing house starts to challenge groups to meet 
benchmarks set by the most successful, to be accountable for their own 
process, and to learn from their own and others' experiences. Learning 
becomes systematized. In light of the unequal distribution of resources and 
expertise in different areas of the region, the clearing house starts to 
consider providing capacity-building resources to struggling regions. 
Information is managed in increasingly comprehensive and nuanced ways. 
As the local groups digest and reflect upon this body of knowledge, they in 
turn cause the centre to reformulate its own goalposts and refine its own 
conclusions. The clearing house learns that technical expertise and a good, 
accessible resource library, while indispensable, is no substitute for 
inclusive local deliberations in terms of reaching consensus and creating 
appropriate new possibilities. 
At the same time, people recognize that even the most perfect public 
deliberative process is incomplete and fragile without some sense of the 
social ends toward which it is directed. They return to the four pillars of the 
national constitutional tradition--federalism, democracy, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, and respect for minorities--and they begin to think in 
earnest about the meaning of a "qualitative clear majority" on the question 
of the region's future relationship with the rest of the country. The local 
groups--more responsive, more accessible, possessed of greater contextual 
intelligence than the centre is--retain their autonomy to the extent that they 
follow "good practices" in participation, accountability, fairness, and 
respectful deliberation. Those that demonstrate their use of good 
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participatory practices and adherence to national constitutional values are 
given, in return, a great deal of leeway in their experiments. 
In small steps, as always, the groups begin to venture into the supremely 
difficult territory between constitutionalism and democracy, between 
fairness and efficiency. They experiment with ways to measure "voice." They 
struggle to balance individual and group interests. Repeatedly, they 
confront deep normative disagreements and closely held convictions. With 
the benefit of compounded learning from multiple local experiments, all the 
imaginative resources of the region's diverse society are plowed back into 
the process of developing considered, creative new options for a satisfactory 
collective future. Slowly, new possibilities emerge from the give-and-take. 
Entrenched antagonisms give way to shifting, overlapping coalitions and 
novel accommodations--contingent always, issue-specific, pragmatic and 
discrete--and by an accretion of small agreements, even the questions refine 
and reformulate themselves. What is more, it occurs through a democratic 
process that is more broadly and deeply participatory, more transparent 
and accountable, and more demonstrably successful at achieving social 
consensus than anything that has come before it. 
The change takes everyone--the region, the rest of the country, the rest 
of the world--by surprise. Something that started as a pragmatic experiment 
without grand pretensions has become a new form of flexible, directly 
deliberative democracy. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The story of Quebec's stormy relationship with the rest of Canada is 
dully familiar: the last twenty years have seen two secession referendums, 
two failed attempts to amend the Canadian constitution, countless public 
opinion surveys and one constitutional reference on the precise issue of 
whether it is possible for Quebec to secede legally from the rest of the 
country.1  Nevertheless, the balance of this article suggests that the Blue-Sky 
Story above is not as unfamiliar or as impossible as it may seem at first 
blush. New ways of looking at governance have emerged in recent years, 
which have broad implications for democracy, and which can change the 
range of options available to societies in thinking about and implementing 
their deepest constitutional values. Moreover, these new constitutional 
theories have their roots in some rather innocent-looking, garden variety 
trends toward community-based decision making and governmental 
accountability that already exist in practice, in Canada and elsewhere. Taken 
together with Canada's own constitutional traditions, they make it possible 
to imagine a procedural and conceptual framework for Quebec's ongoing 
                                                          
1 See Part III.B, below, for more on this topic. 
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secession debate that is more successful, more legitimate, and more deeply 
democratic than the ones currently in place. 
The argument that follows proceeds from the position that the terms of 
the current political debate are obscuring the real issues and artificially 
limiting the possibilities available to Quebecers and Canadians. My starting 
point is the potentially controversial one that, given the sharp divisions in 
Quebec society, the best way to answer the secession question is not by way 
of a simple referendum. Referendums are attractive for their directly 
democratic quality. However, they provide adequate, legitimate answers to 
fundamental social questions only where substantial social agreement on 
those underlying questions already exists. They cannot build consensus, and 
they ought not to be used to paper over differences of opinion or to justify 
enforcing the political will of a majority where there is significant 
disagreement. This is the current situation in Quebec: the near equal split 
between sovereigntists and federalists on the last referendum caused a 
political impasse, and, more fundamentally, it indicated a crisis of political 
method with which a traditional political mechanism like the referendum 
was never designed to cope.2 
The process described here is also significantly different from the 
customary calls for public consultation or for the establishment of a Royal 
Commission to study the problem.3  It differs from proposals for reforming 
the electoral system,4 for example, because it contemplates a new form of 
direct democracy rather than modifications to existing structures of 
representative democracy. Moreover, it goes well beyond the public input 
processes that have already been tried.5 While earlier initiatives sought to 
                                                          
2 Historian Michael Ignatieff takes an even dimmer view of using a referendum to negotiate 
treaties with the First Nations in British Columbia, as that province's new Liberal government 
has proposed. In an interview with the Vancouver Sun Ignatieff suggest that such a 
referendum would "damage the identity of the province" and likely "institutionalize majority 
tyranny": D. Beers, "Treaty referendum: 'way of chaos'" Vancouver Sun (3 May 2001) A10. 
3 The Royal Commission is a relatively common institution in Canada, by which the federal 
government appoints a task force of high profile experts to consider a timely issue and make 
recommendations for action. While Royal Commissions generally produce well-researched 
and well-considered reports by qualified individuals, those reports often take several months 
or even years to complete. Alongside the informational mandate, governments have 
historically used Royal Commissions as a device to channel or defer debate on, and 
periodically to gloss over, difficult political issues. 
4 An interesting recent proposal is H. Maclvor, "Proportional and Semi-Proportional Electoral 
Systems: Their Potential Effects on Canadian Politics" (Presented to the Advisory Committee 
of Registered Political Parties, Elections Canada, Ottawa 23 April 1999), online: Elections 
Canada Homepage <http://www.elections.ca/news/research/review_e.html> (date accessed: 
19 April 2000). 
5 Two examples from 1991 are Quebec's Belanger-Campeau Commission and the federal 
Spicer Commission and Beaudoin-Edwards Committees. A short history of these initiatives, 
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capture an accurate "snapshot" of public opinion on constitutional change, 
none of them to date have attempted to turn that public input into a broad-
based dialogue capable of moving the debate systematically forward. 
I suggest a way to reorient this debate by reference to the "rules of the 
game" set out in August 1998 when the Supreme Court of Canada addressed 
the question of what would be required for Quebec to secede unilaterally 
from Canada under Canadian constitutional law.6 In the Secession Reference 
the Court established the hurdle that Quebec must overcome in order to 
secede legally (that is, constitutionally) from Canada: Quebec must achieve 
a clear, qualitative majority vote on a clear referendum question in favour of 
secession. My point is that this standard--the qualitative and legitimate 
majority on a clearly defined and fundamental question--represents an 
important new understanding of how pluralist democracies should be 
approaching constitutional decision making. Moreover, the new goal 
requires a fresh perspective on Canadian federalism and a new kind of 
democratic process.7 
The argument proceeds in three stages. It begins with a thumbnail 
sketch of trends in what is variously called "new public management" or 
"regulatory reform" in the Westminster parliamentary systems. I then touch 
on the Canadian experience with administrative and regulatory reform and 
with employing community-based decision-making tools in a range of 
public and semi-public forums. The pattern seems to be that, while certain 
initiatives are promising in terms of taking seriously broad intersectoral 
community involvement in public decision making, the "missing link" that 
prevents them from being viable new forms of governance is accountability. 
From this point, I move to consider an American constitutional law theory 
that addresses this concern and proposes new possibilities for managing 
participation and achieving effective levels of consensus in heterogeneous, 
complex political systems. The highly original model, developed by Michael 
                                                                                                                                        
produced by a non-profit organization called uni.ca, is available online: uni.ca 
<http://www.uni.ca> (date accessed: 19 April 2000) [hereinafter "uni.ca"]. Uni.ca also hosts 
the link to an ongoing effort to foster dialogue among Canadians about the country's future: 
Dialogue Canada, online: <http://www.uni.ca/dialoguecanada> (date accessed: 19 April 
2000). In August 2001 I joined the Board of Directors of uni.ca, but I would like to 
emphasize that the views expressed here are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of that organization or of any of its other board members. 
6 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter Secession Reference]. 
7 It should become clear through the course of this article that nothing contained here 
amounts to a personal endorsement of dismantling Canadian federalism or complete 
Quebecois secession. On the contrary, for reasons I hope to have articulated below, I remain 
convinced that federalism is the most promising alternative for all of Canada, including 
Quebec. 
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Dorf and Charles Sabel,8 traces its roots to contemporary organizational 
theory as well as, on the philosophical plane, to civic republicanism, 
pragmatism, and radical democracy theory. Dorf and Sabel extrapolate from 
the developments taking place in public management in Canada and 
elsewhere to challenging but logical ends, with significant implications for 
federalism, rights discourse, and the role of the courts in constitutional 
democracies. I argue that the participatory, flexible, and accountable 
processes inherent in democratic experimentalism can contribute to the 
quality of public debate in Quebecois society on the issue of secession. 
The next part introduces the situation in Quebec and reviews the 
Secession Reference. In constructing the Secession Reference as it did, the 
Supreme Court of Canada (certainly without conscious awareness of the 
theory itself, though perhaps influenced by underlying developments in 
Canadian public management) is operating much like the democratic 
experimentalist court Dorf and Sabel describe. It sets out only the broad 
normative framework within which democratic constitutional deliberation is 
to take place--that is, the four pillars of the Canadian constitutional tradition: 
democracy, federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for 
minorities--and leaves the resolution of the details to the political process. 
As well, the Court's method seeks to ensure that the democratic process is 
operating legitimately and with due regard for the participation interests of 
social groups by establishing a network of procedural expectations 
analogous to the "rolling best practices standards" described by Dorf and 
Sabel. As is appropriate in serious constitutional discourse, the Court 
allocates political and judicial roles in a way that balances democratic 
pressures with the protective mechanisms that constitutional rights require in 
any pluralistic and unequal society. 
Finally, the article considers whether the fluid, decentralized 
constitutional model proposed by Dorf and Sabel is capable of coexisting, at 
an essential level, with Canada's unique experiences with managing a 
culturally and linguistically pluralist democracy. I sketch out the 
relationship between Canada's historical experiences, its sophisticated 
national scholarship on multicultural citizenship and identity, and the 
assumptions behind the Secession Reference. I reach the conclusion that 
democratic experimentalist methods can be sensitive to the Canadian 
tradition of granting explicit recognition to minority groups, as well as 
individuals, and conversely, there is nothing in the Secession Reference that 
would contraindicate applying a DE-style fluid deliberative model. On the 
contrary, the model may hold out substantial promise as a way of managing 
                                                          
8 C. Sabel & M. Dorf, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism" (1998) 98 Colum. L. 
Rev. 267 [hereinafter "DE"]. A more recent version of the article will soon be published as a 
book (Harvard University Press, forthcoming in 2001). 
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the tension between unity and diversity in Canada. Moreover, the 
understanding of constitutional federalism that emerges in the Secession 
Reference is an important contribution to democratic experimentalism itself. 
I conclude with some observations about the meaning and importance of the 
notion of the "clear qualitative majority" developed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
This article represents a preliminary and ambitious weaving together of 
a new constitutional theory, the animating principles of Canadian 
constitutionalism, and some trends in public decision making that have been 
operating in Canada for some time. There is enormous and exciting further 
work to be done. Moreover, any imagined approach to a pragmatic public 
decision-making experiment like this one can only be a starting point, one of 
limited value outside the field of real human interaction. Nevertheless, 
enough synergies exist between these three trends that each side of the 
conversation stands to be enriched: Canada stands to enrich its troubled 
federalism debate (as well as its public management practices) by 
considering new imaginative possibilities. In return, the Canadian 
perspective on cultural pluralism makes a unique and important contribution 
to the emerging transnational scholarship on new forms of governance.9 The 
opportunities for stimulating debate alone make the exercise worthwhile. 
III. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM IN CANADA 
A. LOOKING BEYOND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS 
1. PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN WESTMINSTER 
This discussion must begin with a description of some fundamental 
changes in public management theory that have taken place over the last two 
decades. The model employed below is an American one, and Canadians in 
particular may tend to associate certain of its characteristics--the 
incorporation of lessons from private sector management theory into public 
governance; the delegation of seemingly public regulatory duties to private 
actors--with a distinctly American style of governance within which the 
public sector plays a comparatively less central role in society. Even within 
the United States these models are sometimes linked conceptually with 
"conservative" trends toward devolving responsibility for social programs to 
                                                          
9 Other models of governance exist in Tony Blair's so-called "Third Way" in the United 
Kingdom, his approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland, and emerging versions of 
federalism and parliamentarism in Northern Ireland. Further comparative study is warranted 
on the commonalities and divergences between American democratic experimentalism, 
Canadian perspectives on federalism and governance, and various related conversations 
taking place in Europe on the subject of "network governance." See for example infra note 
37. 
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the state level, relying on voluntary compliance codes for industry, and 
generally pulling away from more activist governmental models. In fact, this 
is not accurate: the model is an integral part of contemporary Westminster 
public administration. Moreover, while the new regulatory (or "new public 
management") model was developed as a tool for enforcing restraint on 
government, its demonstrated value in improving regulatory efficiency and 
effectiveness has led to its adoption by governments across the political 
spectrum.10 
According to Peter Aucoin's comparative study of governance in the 
Westminster systems of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 
this "revolution in public management" first arose during Margaret 
Thatcher's tenure in Britain as part of a larger economic and political 
program of enforcing restraint on government. In the 1980s the new 
approach came to be adopted by political parties across the political 
spectrum, including Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand. In 
each of the Westminster systems, elected officials had come to believe that 
the professional bureaucracy had acquired too much control over the 
management of the state, that bureaucratic organizational design had 
become too restrictive of both bureaucrats and elected officials, and that the 
bureaucracy had become pathologically observant of rigid rules and 
procedures. Pressure on government to achieve better results came from 
three sources common to all Western democracies at the time: the political 
and economic need to reduce public spending, the widespread decline of 
public confidence in the effectiveness and quality of public programs, and 
the need for nation-states to compete in a new, global economic order.11 
Efforts were made to emphasize performance and measurable results, to 
break up ossified institutional structures, and to prioritize responsiveness. 
The result was a new public management ethic that consolidated authority 
for developing high-level strategic priorities and strict budgetary restrictions 
at the centre of government, while devolving operations and implementation 
to dedicated departments and private stakeholders on the basis of 
incremental efficiency assessments. In effect, this meant that standard-
setting, monitoring, and other aspects of policy implementation were 
developed in concert with private industry, outside contractors, and other 
non-governmental stakeholders.12 Along with decentralization, the model 
                                                          
10 See P. Aucoin, The New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective 
(Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1995) [hereinafter The New Public 
Management] for a carefully argued analysis of the reform efforts within Great Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. 
11 Ibid. at 1-4, 31-38. 
12 Devolving standard-setting tasks to industry is a significant move from a governance 
perspective, and it has attracted important comment in Europe, see infra note 37. 
10 
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consciously borrowed other effective private sector management strategies, 
such as performance and outcome measures (including targeting and 
benchmarking), best practices comparisons, and steps to augment the 
flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and "corporatization" of the public service. 
On a deeper level, the new model was also a response to conceptual 
questions about the legitimacy of the modern administrative state.13 
Particularly in New Zealand, where the new managerialism was 
influenced by a coherent application of public choice theory and 
organizational economic theory (including agency and transaction cost 
economic models)14 and adjusted pragmatically for Westminster political 
and constitutional traditions,15 the reforms were sweeping. The experiment 
in New Zealand was exceptional in its ambition, its coherence, the novel 
ways in which theoretical and practical influences were integrated, and its 
                                                          
13 The challenge raised to the administrative state in parliamentary systems arose out of deep 
cynicism about the accountability and impartiality of the professional civil service. The 
modern Westminster model of government rests on two pillars: responsible government and 
the professional public service. The principle of responsible government means that elected 
politicians must assume complete responsibility for all actions taken by the bureaucracy 
under their management. Politicians are expected to resign their posts should serious errors or 
scandals emerge from their ministry, whether or not they were involved in the problem or 
even had actual knowledge of it. The principle of the professional public service envisions a 
cadre of long serving career bureaucrats chosen on the basis of merit and held to high ethical 
standards. Because they are accountable to the elected representative in the event of 
incompetence or improper execution of their function, and because their careers outlive any 
one government's tenure, their interests lie in loyal, competent, and non-partisan service of 
the elected representative's policies. Thus the accountability of the public service is entirely 
internal to the government department. The intellectual challenge to the idea of a career 
public service came from public choice theory, augmented in the context of the closed 
character of the administrative state. The resulting image, particularly in the United Kingdom 
and Canada, was of a self-serving, unaccountable, budget-maximizing and bloated public 
bureaucracy. Over the past five years the Westminster systems may have halted the trend 
toward politicization of their bureaucracies and reaffirmed the value of the independent, 
professional civil service as part of the "new public management approach": The New Public 
Management, supra note 10 at 25-34, 49-82. A careful assessment of the effect of new public 
management theory on responsible government and the professional public service in New 
Zealand appears in J. Boston et al., Public Management: The New Zealand Model (Auckland, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 316-47 [hereinafter The New Zealand Model]. The 
modern administrative state has also been under attack in the United States, of course, though 
for different reasons. 
14 The New Zealand Model, ibid. at 16-40. 
15 Ibid. at 42-68, 333-47. A few key aspects of the framework of government in New Zealand 
are its unitary (i.e., non-federal) structure; its parliamentary (i.e., "Westminster") and 
"responsible" form of government; the exceptional historical dominance of the executive 
branch under a series of single-party majority governments; its firmly established state-
owned enterprises and cadre of career public servants; and its Whitehall-derived 
constitutional conventions and common law tradition of judicial review, supplemented by 
statutes including a Bill of Rights Act. See generally The New Zealand Model. 
11 
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success: in 1993 the World Economic Forum ranked New Zealand first for 
the quality of its government.16  Crucially, the Labour government that 
initiated the reforms did so in concert, not with "downloading" of public 
responsibilities to the voluntary/private sectors, or with renunciation of 
social justice concerns, but with a range of progressive new social policies, 
including European ("Pakeha")--Maori biculturalism,17 and equal 
employment opportunities for women, minorities, and the disabled.18 
Some commentators suggest that the new rules of public management 
hold the potential to change not only administrative processes and 
procedures, but also the understanding of government itself. Combined with 
diminished public confidence in both electoral institutions and technocratic 
solutions, some observers envision an important cognitive shift within the 
bureaucracy to a new understanding of public management as "a process of 
state-citizen relations in which dialogue and deliberations between citizens 
and the agents of the state, especially public servants, constitute both a 
necessary and a sufficient response to the perennial questions of 
                                                          
16 Ibid. at 3. 
17 Ibid. at 141-59. Biculturalism under the Labour administration was aimed at enhancing 
governmental responsiveness to Maori needs and cultural traditions, alleviating racial 
inequality, and addressing the Crown's obligations to the Maori people under the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal was broadened to allow for the 
investigation of Treaty claims back to 1840, Maori was made an official language, and Treaty 
principles were accorded statutory recognition in a number of important pieces of legislation. 
As well, an attempt was made to devolve the funding and control of many services provided 
by the Department of Maori Affairs to tribally based institutions. The National 
administration, which came to power in 1990, approached the situation from a more 
traditionally liberal philosophical perspective and modified the bicultural policy, while 
retaining the new public management model. 
18 Ibid. at 246-57. See also K. Gover & N. Baird, "Devolution and Maori Autonomy--
Accidental Resonance? Liberal Democracy and Tribal Peoples: Group Rights in Aotearoa 
New Zealand" (New York University School of Law Symposium, 2 October 2000) 
[unpublished]. Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird recently have suggested that the 
transformation of public administration and the evolution and articulation of Maori rights that 
took place over the same time period became symbiotically and complexly interrelated in 
practice. They argue that governmental policies of privatization and devolution, combined 
with effort toward coming to terms with Maori treaty claims, provided a space within which 
new Maori collectives and forms of autonomy emerged and proliferated. The more complex, 
fluid, and multidimensional notion of Maori identity that emerged necessarily changed the 
Crown/Maori relationship--and the government's institutions and strategies themselves. 
Gover and Baird suggest that, rather than attempting to restrict the debate between Maori 
groups on the proper loci of political representation, the Crown must accept that "the newly 
complex Crown/Maori interface has outgrown channelling devices, such as legislatively 
imposed tribal and pan-tribal structures." They argue in favour of a more passive Crown role 
that provides for an ongoing dialogue that can "further Maori aspirations for autonomy and 
well-being by permitting the sharing of information and strategies, allowing for inter-Maori 
discussion on relations between new and traditional groupings, and facilitating the collective 
Maori resolution of inter-group disputes." 
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governance."19 For Aucoin, a management model with an awareness of its 
implications for governance generally would be based on three behavioral 
pillars: 
First, greater attention must be given to the views of citizens in 
the design and delivery of public services. Second, sufficient 
authority must be devolved to those who are responsible for 
the operational aspects of public services, especially those on 
the front lines of service provision. Third, citizens must be 
well informed about the services to which they are entitled and 
the costs of these services; service targets and standards must 
be set for those providing them; and public managers and their 
organizations must be accountable for respecting citizen 
entitlements and meeting their targets and standards within the 
limits of the resources provided.20 
The real challenge, however, is to integrate performance-based 
managerial models operating within a Westminster "impartial" public 
service with real-world politics and deeper social norms--in Aucoin's words, 
to address the question of whether "an effective accommodation can be 
reached in reforming both the partisan dynamics of responsible government 
and the non-partisan requirements of good government."21 Aucoin has noted 
that the idealized "post-bureaucratic paradigm," within which public sector 
actors manage their operations dispassionately and based entirely on 
objective outcome indicators, fails to take into account the realities of 
power, conflict, and competing interests in public administration--
constraints that are the inevitable result of legitimate policy choices by 
elected representatives.22  For public decision making to be truly effective, 
therefore, management techniques such as best practices performance 
standards must be accompanied by clearly articulated fundamental policy 
objectives emanating from central policy-makers.23 
Equally important, Aucoin argues that the ongoing challenge for the 
new public management style is to provide for the "missing link" of an 
accountability regime for public actors. Accountability to the democratic 
polity, through its elected representatives, can be improved through 
                                                          
19 M. Barzelay, Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) as applied by Aucoin, The New Public 
Management, supra note 10 at 168. 
20 The New Public Management, ibid. at 10. 
21 Ibid. at 256. 
22 Ibid. at 173-79. 
23 Ibid. at 183-97. 
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increased transparency in decision making, improved reporting and 
information sharing, and properly designed public performance audits. 
When coexisting with devolved decision making, accountability also 
requires a certain degree of political leadership from the centre, combined 
with structural safeguards to ensure that public servants are not forced to 
become politicized and that performance evaluations are premised on fact-
based review rather than the vagaries of politics.24 Aucoin recommends 
establishing codes of ethics for public actors to manage the risk of devolving 
authority on such a widespread basis. He also argues that meaningful 
consultation with citizens, going beyond the mere expression of wants and 
demands, is crucial to designing and providing responsive and accountable 
public decision-making structures. Finally, citizens must have access to 
complaint and redress mechanisms to deal with administrative failures, 
through the courts if necessary.25 
2. THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODEL IN CANADA 
Canada was not as quick to adopt the new management style as were the 
other Westminster systems, perhaps due to a failure of political will under 
the Trudeau and Mulroney governments.26 Canada was also somewhat timid 
by comparison in terms of the scale of its reforms, preferring to engage in 
department-by-department analysis rather than a generalized review. 27 Real 
change began in 1993 when then Prime Minister Kim Campbell announced 
a comprehensive overhaul of government and established a standing 
Regulatory Best Practices Committee within the federal Treasury Board. 
The new approach then guided the largest review of regulation ever 
undertaken at the federal level in Canada, under the government of Jean 
Chretien, in 1993. Entitled "Program Review," it involved establishing best 
practices standards in government departments as diverse as Transport 
Canada, Health and Welfare Canada, and the Bureau of Competition Policy. 
Those standards were used to measure improvement, improve outcomes, 
                                                          
24 Ibid. at 217-42. Importantly, the Westminster tradition of the impartial, permanent, and 
professional public service is more than attitudinal or symbolic. B. Ackerman, "The New 
Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 at 696-707, has argued that American 
separation of powers doctrine leaves bureaucrats no stable base of political support, forcing 
them to behave in consciously political, short-term oriented ways. Parliamentarism, by 
contrast, gives bureaucrats strong incentives to behave with neutral competence and to take a 
long term perspective. See also B.G. Peters & D.J. Savoie, "Reviewing the Reviewers: 
Program Review in the United States and Canada" in P. Aucoin & D.J. Savoie, eds., 
Managing Strategic Change: Learning from Program Review (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Management Development, 1998) 249 [hereinafter Learning from Program Review]. 
25 The New Public Management, ibid. at 217-40. 
26 Ibid. at 10-16, 141-51. 
27 Ibid. at 10-19. 
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and develop policy in several areas including delegating powers to the 
private sector, providing for stakeholder consultation, developing front-end 
assessment guidelines, consensus building, and evaluating alternative 
methods of securing compliance.28 Government departments and external 
service providers were scrutinized on the basis of their ability to meet 
performance benchmarks set by other actors in terms of both outcome and 
process. Substantial institutional learning about managing strategic change 
and engaging the public service was acquired through the program review 
process.29 
Since that time, new public management methods have become key 
tools for rationalizing public decision making and governmental structure.30 
Alongside Program Review and similar initiatives at virtually all levels of 
the traditional public sector and private sector-style management techniques 
in state-owned enterprises, new management models are operating in 
Canada in diverse public and semi-public forums including (to suggest only 
a few examples) the operation of housing co-operatives nationwide and the 
Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth's VISION 2020 sustainable 
                                                          
28 See Canada, Enlightened Practices in Regulatory Reforms, vols. 1, 2 (1992, 1993), online: 
<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=e&Page=Publications> (date accessed: 12 
July 2001). Recent Treasury Board publications concerning quality services, results-based 
management, accountability and review can be found online: <http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pubpol_e.html> (date accessed: 25 August 2001). 
29 See, for example, Learning from Program Review, supra note 24. 
30 This is not to suggest that the story of the new public management in Canada has been 
entirely happy; far from it. Under both federal and provincial governments in the 1990s, the 
model was implemented in tandem with large-scale cost- and staff-cutting, which adversely 
affected the extent of improvement in public sector service provision and outcomes. While 
the model was cited as a justification, the cuts themselves were often deeper, broader, and 
seemingly more "checkerboard" in nature than careful application of a rationalizing model 
would have indicated. Moreover, the new public management had the historical misfortune of 
being championed by governments that lacked the credibility needed to get people "behind" 
such sweeping changes: many Ontarians have vivid memories of the dysfunction and outright 
rebellion that characterized Ontario's public service under Premier Bob Rae, for example. 
These stumbles are an important part of the story of the new public management in Canada, 
as elsewhere. Yet the experiments left their mark, and--apparently without exception--
subsequent governments did not remove all traces of them and return to old organizational 
pathways. It appears that the experiments had long-term effects, in part, because even 
observers who worked toward recovering lost ground in public service provision realized that 
the bureaucratic disentrenchment and procedural opening up that came out of those years 
were not, in and of themselves, an unmitigated evil. Today one would be hard pressed to 
point to any government in Canada that has not been affected--either by internal design or the 
pressure of external example--by the new public management model and its correspondingly 
greater scope for collaborative public/private decision making and its open-ended, 
pragmatically-oriented evaluative techniques. The prospect of returning to the old 
hierarchical structure becomes ever more remote as other social actors (including non-
governmental organizations) discover and seize opportunities presented by the new structure 
and become accustomed to collaboration with, rather than dictates from, public servants. 
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community initiative.31 At the provincial level, important experiments in 
community-based norm development and decision making have been taking 
place in health care policy in both British Columbia32 and Ontario33 since 
1993. 
                                                          
31 Descriptions of these and other initiatives are available through a "best practices clearing 
house" web site maintained by UNESCO's Management of Social Transformations 
Programme ("MOST"), online: MOST <http://www.unesco.org/most/> (date accessed: 13 
August 2001). The articles referred to above here are "Co-operative Housing in Canada: A 
Model for Empowered Communities," online: MOST 
<http://www.unesco.org/most/usa3.htm> (date acessed: 13 August 2001); and "Creating a 
Sustainable Community: Hamilton-Wentworth's VISION 2020," online: MOST 
<http://www.unesco.org/most/usa4.htm> (dated accessed: 13 August 2001). Details about the 
Hamilton-Wentworth's Regional Official Plan can be obtained online: 
<http://www.vision2020.hamilton-went.on.ca/> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). 
Significantly, MOST is only one of several new Internet clearing houses directed at applying 
new management models to public service provision and the not-for-profit sector; another 
good web site is maintained by the Center for What Works, online: 
<http://www.whatworks.org> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). 
32 The provincial government's health care policy reform, dubbed "New Directions," 
devolved decision making from the provincial Ministry of Health to community health 
councils ("CHC") and regional health boards ("RHB"). Originally the CHCs--some 
representing no more than a thousand constituents--were responsible for identifying local 
health priorities and setting policy to achieve these ends. The RHBs, of which there were 21, 
were responsible for regional health planning and service coordination in order to retain some 
of the benefits of the economy of scale. (In 1996 the model was modified: there are now 34 
CHCs, 11 RHBs, and 7 community health services societies ("CHSS"). The CHSSs have 
assumed the CHCs' responsibilities for community health services, and the CHCs now deal 
only with acute and long term care. The general philosophy of the New Directions initiative 
remains unchanged.) By statutory design, health care priorities and provision mechanisms at 
all levels are subject to regular re-evaluation. The Ministry of Health provides support, rather 
than direction, to the communities and regions; sets broad guidelines respecting core health 
services; and facilitates communication between the local units. Although the local decision-
making bodies are defined by geography, the New Directions scheme also mandates broad 
community participation on CHCs, CHSSs, and RHBs. In particular, communities are 
required to ensure that historically marginalized groups and those with special health care 
needs (e.g., women, the elderly, the disabled, and ethnic or cultural minority groups) are 
represented adequately. All community boards must have at least one Aboriginal 
representative. Involvement by other community players, including poverty advocates, school 
boards, and health care workers and providers is strongly encouraged. I have discussed these 
initiatives in "Democracy, Health, and Place: A Review of the New Directions Policy 
Initiative in British Columbia" (1996) [unpublished] [hereinafter "Democracy, Health, and 
Place"]. See also British Columbia Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors: 
New Directions for a Healthy British Columbia (Policy Document, February 1993); and 
British Columbia Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Processes, 
Benchmarks and Responsibilities for Developing Community Health Councils and Regional 
Health Boards (Policy Document, May 1994). The model has been successful and continues 
to operate in British Columbia with some modifications arising out of its implementation 
(Letter from P. Chuly to C. Ford (7 March 2000)). The Ministry's Homepage 
<http://www.gov.bc.ca/healthservices/> provides resources to health care practitioners, 
citizens, and communities in the province. Its 1999-2002 Strategic Directions Report may be 
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Many of these projects are promising demonstrations of how productive 
connections between public, social, and private spheres are possible through 
centralized coordination of communication; local establishment of rolling 
best practices standards and benchmarking; transparent procedure; and 
broad-based stakeholder participation. As significant new forms of 
governance, however, each is incomplete. Particularly in those projects that 
take community-based decision making seriously--such as Ontario's Healthy 
Communities Project--what is often missing, as Aucoin has suggested,34 is 
                                                                                                                                        
found online: Ministry of Health Services 
<http://www.hlth.gov.bc.ca/cpa/publications/strategic/pdf> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). 
33 The Ontario Healthy Communities Coalition ("OHCC") is based on the World Health 
Organization's "Healthy Cities" Project, and unlike the B.C. model, it is adjunctive rather 
than central to provincial health care provision. Its goal is to "build healthier communities" 
(defined broadly) through a process characterized by wide community participation, broad 
intersectoral involvement in decision making, local government commitment, and interaction 
with "healthy public policy" at the provincial level. The OHCC seeks to foster sustainable 
links between government and health-related projects that originate independently at the 
community level. With the assistance of an OHCC regional resource person, the local 
initiative is provided with capacity-building resources and guided through strategic planning, 
dispute resolution, and coalition-building. The OHCC emphasizes the participatory, process-
oriented, pragmatic and local nature of the model and the importance of using pre-existing 
provincial associations as networks for reaching into the communities' civil society and for 
providing support in the form of resources and in-kind services. Once formed, the community 
coalition is coached through a series of steps including interacting with local government; 
identifying key players; developing an intersectoral approach and a "working structure" to 
coordinate the process; and developing a plan of action. At each step coalition members are 
expected to evaluate their work and plan for the next step in order to develop benchmarks and 
establish rolling best practice standards. If information (obtained through networking) leads a 
coalition's members to believe that a project should be implemented in partnership with 
another local coalition, that process is facilitated through the OHCC. Similarly, community 
coalitions are encouraged to examine other communities' experiences to determine whether 
and how their methods could be improved. Coalitions are encouraged to seek external 
funding for their programs and to design them to be self-supporting where possible. The 
OHCC Board of Directors is not a funding or authoritative body; it establishes only broad 
project guidelines to be implemented by community organizations. The OHCC also 
maintains a central office--a clearing house designed to support local coalitions and 
initiatives, identify resource people at the community level, and develop networks to train, 
problem solve, and exchange information among communities. It publishes a regular 
newsletter and recognizes local coalitions' success stories, both on paper and the Internet. It 
also maintains print, electronic and video resource libraries on process, evaluation and 
indicator tools, and organizing skills for the communities' use, as well as a national and 
international Peer Resource List and Network. Community initiatives pursued through the 
OHCC to date include the development of alternative transportation networks, child nutrition 
programs, job creation programs, tourist promotion initiatives, improved health care access 
programs, and programs for community policing and reducing violence in schools. 
Cooperative ventures between adjacent groups have also led to new committee structures in 
some areas. The OHCC web site is online: OHCC <http://www.opc.on.ca/ohcc> (date 
accessed: 13 August 2001). 
34 Supra note 10 at 217-42. 
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accountability: both of the centre to the local units and of the local units 
generally. That is, although community groups are encouraged to engage in 
benchmarking and rolling best-practice rule making, nothing in the 
administrative or regulatory architecture of the programs critically evaluates 
their success in using these methods. They are not challenged to "bootstrap" 
their effectiveness upward by comparison with other groups. Local 
coalitions concerned about health care are not answerable to citizens, the 
central office, or the board of directors (though they are answerable to 
private funders) for failure to meet benchmarks, or even for failure to set 
them in the first place. In short, they are not subject to the kind of 
performance and process standards that the Canadian government sets for 
service providers and its own departments during Program Review. Without 
such structures in place, the community groups are not equipped to establish 
firm standards or actually to implement policy. Correspondingly, while the 
clearing house engages in networking, it does not institutionalize learning 
and push the reflective process to its full potential, which would entail 
having the communities critically review their own outcomes and actually 
participate in generating larger norms. Moreover, because the groups need 
not answer to the centre for the inclusiveness, contestability, or transparency 
of their processes,35 the local experiments risk being captured by small 
groups of citizens.36 Thus, while such initiatives are important first steps in 
recognizing the value and effectiveness of broadly participatory, 
community-based decision-making processes, one must expect the 
programs' individual community success stories to remain discrete, 
disjointed, and somewhat accidental. Without reciprocal accountability and 
                                                          
35 See J. Cohen & C. Sabel, "Directly Deliberative Polyarchy" (1997) 3 Eur. L.J. 313 at 327-
30. [hereinafter "Polyarchy"]. The requirement that reasons be given is a central component 
of legitimate participatory decision-making practices, particularly in pluralist contexts. 
Giving reasons provides a clear "paper trail" to assist courts and others in evaluating the 
decision-makers' proposal, and it keeps the process transparent. Giving reasons is also an 
important way to demonstrate respect for the other stakeholders in the deliberations. It forces 
people to be more other-regarding and (in the inevitable case of disagreement) makes it easier 
for those who do not get their way to understand and accept their loss. Subjecting decisions to 
"peer review" also gives parties an incentive to ground their arguments on shared beliefs 
where possible and exerts a centripetal and focusing effect on the deliberations. See also S. 
Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies" (1991) 79 Geo. L.J. 1357. She argues 
that fairness, participation, and reasoned and principled conduct are basic principles of legal 
legitimacy. 
36 This may be a problem in the British Columbia Health Care scheme where CHC, CHSS, 
and RHB board members serve for fixed terms. Moreover, they are appointed by the Ministry 
of Health rather than elected by the community. Somewhat controversially, the Ministry tries 
to use the appointment process to prevent "special interest" board capture and ensure 
adequate representation. It has periodically overridden local communities' appointment 
recommendations in favour of an outside appointment. See "Democracy, Health and Place," 
supra note 32. 
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institutionalized learning, they do not translate into an effective and deeply 
legitimate large-scale model for public administration or governance. 
3. A NEW THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the Westminster systems were able to become 
international leaders in public management reform for two primary reasons 
related to the high degree of concentrated authority that characterized 
them.37 To begin with, as a structural matter the executive branches of these 
Commonwealth governments are granted a high degree of discretion (as 
compared to the American system of divided government) to change the 
machinery of government without seeking legislative change. Second, as 
                                                          
37 In Europe, by contrast, it was the strength of the national governments and the weakness of 
the central regulatory institutions that made devolution and industry-driven reforms the only 
obvious and politically viable solution. In a fascinating convergence, it turns out that similar 
developments have been occurring in the European Union, though catalyzed by entirely 
different forces. Theoretical developments are also proceeding along very analogous lines. 
The "New Approach" to harmonization was launched through a Council Resolution in 1985 
("Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards, OJ 1985 
C 136/1.") The complete storyline, running through the judgment of the European Court of 
Justice in Cassis de Dijon, the White Paper, and the multiple transformations that took place 
in 1992 following Maastricht, is found in C. Joerges et al., "European Product Safety, 
Internal Market Policy and the New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standards" 
EUI Working Papers LAW 91/10-14 (European University Institute, Department of Law, 
Florence), online: European University Institute <http://www.iue.it/LAW/WP-
Texts/Joerges91/> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). Other accounts include K.A. Armstrong 
& S.J. Bulmer, The Governance of the Single Market (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998) and E. Vos, Institutional Frame works of Community Health and Safety 
Regulation. Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies (Portland: Hart Publishing, 1999). The 
European regulatory initiatives developed out of the desire to harmonize national technical 
directives in the interest of market integration. Because there was no political choice in the 
face of established national regulatory schemes, the Union limited itself to developing broad 
guidelines, leaving the drafting to national governments and the standard-setting to the 
regulated industries themselves on the basis of their own best practices. Only recently has the 
debate arrived at considering the larger social, democratic, and rights implications of such 
steps, including the need to ensure that consumer and environmental interests are also 
consulted. Yet the so-called "democratic deficit" in EU institutions and policy 
implementation is only one of the the ongoing and vastly different issues to be resolved. The 
European scholarship on new forms of governance is exceptionally sophisticated and 
deserves a comparative treatment in much greater depth than is possible here; it is the project 
of their age. Some of the most interesting recent treatments include C. Joerges, H. Schepel & 
E. Vos, "The Law's Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in Europe's 
Legislative Processes: the Case of Standardisation Under the 'New Approach'" EUI Working 
Paper LAW 99/9 (European University Institute, Department of Law, Florence), online: 
European University Institute <http://www.iue.it/LAW/WP-Texts/Jeorges99/>; B. Kohler-
Koch & R. Eising, eds., The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (New 
York: Routledge, 1999); J. Peterson & E. Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); and A. Heritier, "The accommodation of diversity in 
European policy-making and its outcomes: regulatory policy as a patchwork" (1996) 2 J. Eur. 
Pub. Pol. 149. 
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compared to other parliamentary systems in which coalition governments 
are more the norm, each of these systems was run by strong parliamentary 
majority governments at the time of the model's implementation. This gave 
those governments the luxury of avoiding partisan disagreement and 
compromise.38 
A transformation in public management policy has not taken place in 
the United States with anything like the degree of coordination or 
comprehensiveness that existed in New Zealand, or even in Canada.39 In the 
practice of government-regulated economic and social activity, however, 
private sector organizational theory has carried over into a range of 
organized decision-making processes similar in philosophy and operation to 
the new public management model.40 More important for present purposes, 
the most explicitly articulated and comprehensively imagined theoretical 
model for a new style of governance deriving from that practice has come 
from the United States. While building on the same identifiable trends in 
administrative and regulatory practice, the model of "democratic 
experimentalism" developed by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel goes 
further than mere reform to existing public management structures, no 
matter how normatively significant that reform may be. 
Obviously, theories on governance originating in the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union are as complexly different from each other 
as the societies and circumstances that give rise to them. I am unapologetic 
about throwing them--particularly the Canadian and American streams--
together into an unstable cocktail for the sake of furthering what seems to be 
a very important discussion. I nod periodically to some profound differences 
in theory, but (to use another metaphor) this article is not an attempt to 
untangle the various threads that go into a national political philosophy; it is 
more an attempt to weave some faintly exotic threads into the fabric in the 
interest of enriching it. Canada has something to gain in considering 
possible extrapolations from public management traditions that are already 
established in its practice. Particularly when discussing the constitutional 
issues facing Quebec, it makes sense to speak of democratic 
experimentalism rather than of the new public management because 
                                                          
38 The New Public Management, supra note 10 at 5. 
39 Ibid. at 19. A brief comparative review of early 1990s regulatory reform under the Chretien 
government and the Clinton administration (including an important cautionary point on the 
vast differences between the parliamentary and presidential systems and the limits of 
comparative analysis of macrolevel policy development) is offered by Peters & Savoie in 
Learning from Program Review, supra note 24. 
40 "DE," supra note 8. The authors discuss initiatives in family support services at 324-27; 
community policing at 327-32; nuclear power plant safety at 371-73; historical antecedents in 
forestry at 364-71; military procurement at 332-36; and public health at 416-17. 
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democratic experimentalism takes existing management theory to logical 
but much more far-reaching conclusions in the service of larger social goals. 
Thus it seeks to address Aucoin's concerns about linking accountability with 
good government, discusses democracy in explicit terms, and entrenches 
constitutional safeguards for a nation's fundamental rights and values. 
a. Origins and Attributes of Democratic Experimentalism 
Democratic experimentalism is a challenging theoretical model for the 
practice of constitutionalism. It proposes a framework for a novel way of 
making public decisions, characterized by a directly democratic process of 
ongoing, open-ended elaboration and revision of both means and ends.41 It 
draws insights from a wide variety of sources, including organizational and 
management theory, philosophical pragmatism, radical democratic and 
civic-republican political theory, and a tradition of practical public interest 
lawyering. 
Like the new public management model, the immediate roots of 
democratic experimentalism are in organizational and management theory. 
Because new public management models were not implemented 
comprehensively in the United States, Dorf and Sabel construct their 
analysis directly from a study of structural process changes that have taken 
place in the private sector over the last few decades. They argue that 
changing market forces and the influence of so-called "new management 
theory" catalyzed a series of radical shifts in management style and 
organization in private industry in North America. Specifically, many 
corporations have shifted away from familiar hierarchical, rigid decision-
making structures in favour of more pragmatic, team-based organizing 
principles that rely on continuous information exchange and collaboration 
among key players to identify, consider, and realize the corporation's 
objectives.42 Dorf and Sabel then go on to argue that these organizing 
                                                          
41 Dorf and Sabel's article, ibid., is a theoretical articulation, in the constitutional context, of a 
model that Sabel has also applied to a number of other specific contexts. See also C. Sabel, 
D. O'Rourke & A. Fung, "Stepping Up Labor Standards," with A. Fung & D. O'Rourke, 
(February/March 2001) 26 The Boston Review 4; J. Liebman & C. Sabel, "The Emerging 
Model of Public School Governance and Legal Reform: Beyond Redistribution and 
Privatization" (Montreal Conference of Collective Rights, Identity and Public Education, 
June 2000), online: through Sabel's web page at 
<http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm> (date accessed: 25 August 2001); and C. 
Sabel, A. Fung, & B. Karkkainen, After Backyard Environmentalism: Toward a 
Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000) 
[hereinafter Backyard Environmentalism]. For this article, an important companion piece has 
been Polyarchy, supra note 35, which considers aspects of social deliberations between 
groups within a pluralistic society. 
42 "DE," ibid. at 292-314. 
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principles of the "new management" are not confined to the private sector, 
and that in several fields of government-regulated economic and social 
activity, the organizational principles employed by government regulators 
have also changed to reflect the changing organizational structure of the 
sectors they regulate.43 
Strikingly, although each "national" perspective developed somewhat 
independently of the others, there are unmistakable convergences between 
the developments that Dorf and Sabel describe in the United States and the 
new public management in Westminster (as well as market integration-
driven policies in the European Union). The outstanding characteristic of the 
new regulatory model that Dorf and Sabel observe is the decentralization of 
decision-making power, coordinated loosely through a centralized 
regulatory agency. These innovative regulatory agencies do not seek 
definitive answers to empirical and policy questions. Rather, they set 
temporary standards of industry conduct, which are based upon the best 
practices to emerge from industry actors in communication with one 
another. For example, rather than specifying a particular means of carrying 
out an industry task, regulators attempt to define the ends to be achieved by 
reference to existing industry standards of best practice. Those ends are 
subject to an ongoing process of re-evaluation and modification as required, 
a process known as "rolling best-practice rule making."44 The process is 
characterized throughout by continuous, non-hierarchical and effective 
communication directed at the common goal of appropriate industry 
regulation, largely as defined by the parties themselves. Thus in the new 
regulatory model, industry stakeholders participate directly in the 
formulation of policy through the development and constant retooling of 
rolling best practices standards; regulators participate in the activities they 
regulate through ongoing, two-way communication with their constituents 
and coordination between different industry players; transparent procedures 
marked by ongoing dialogue, accountability, and constant review limit the 
parties' opportunities to capture the process and to engage in self-interested 
conduct. 
Dorf and Sabel argue that administrative agencies are particularly well-
suited to this kind of flexible decision-making structure due to their 
proximity to the industries they regulate, their expertise in setting standards 
and coordinating participation and deliberation across groups, and their 
demonstrated ability (at least in some industries) to benchmark the standards 
they themselves provide by reference to the rolling best practice standards of 
their constituents.45 The new structure, in turn, increases the agencies' claim 
                                                          
43 Ibid. at 324-36, 364-73, 416-17. 
44 Ibid. at 350-54. 
45 Ibid. at 444. 
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to democratic legitimacy.46 However, the assumption behind democratic 
experimentalism as a more general model--and the point at which it leaves 
New Public Management behind--is that these new-style organizing 
principles can be applied to the institutions of democratic governance 
generally. Dorf and Sabel argue that as society has become more complex 
and interdependent, the centralized, hierarchical, and inflexible government 
structures that have characterized the American administrative system since 
the era of the New Deal--including not only old-style administrative rule 
making but, strikingly, current practices of judicial review and 
representative majority rule government--have become increasingly ill-
suited to responding to rapidly evolving social needs and goals.47 The most 
ambitious observation of democratic experimentalism is that the 
"fundamental and widely diffused changes in the organization of 
cooperation" in certain regulated forums provide the basis for "a renewed 
understanding of the concepts of freedom and equality of citizens that form 
the common heritage of modern constitutional democracies."48 
The democratic experimentalism model is philosophically located 
within the pragmatic philosophical tradition, which for Dorf and Sabel 
assumes 
[an] account of thought and action as problem solving in a 
world, familiar to our time, that is bereft of first principles and 
beset by unintended consequences, ambiguity, and difference. 
Thus, a central theme ... is the reciprocal determination of 
means and ends: ... the objectives presumed in the guiding 
understandings of theories, strategies, or ideals of justice are 
transformed in the light of the experience of their pursuit, and 
these transformations in turn redefine what counts as a means 
to a guiding end. Pragmatism thus takes the pervasiveness of 
unintended consequences, understood most generally as the 
impossibility of defining first principles that survive the effort 
to realize them, as a constitutive feature of thought and action, 
and not as an unfortunate incident of modern political life.49 
                                                          
46 Ibid. at 438-44. A primary impetus for the model is a perceived crisis in modern American 
constitutionalism. In the context of the separation of powers and federalism doctrines set out 
by the framers of the American Constitution, the legitimacy of the modern, undemocratic, 
post-New Deal administrative state is questionable (ibid. at 270-72). See also Ackerman, 
supra note 24. 
47 "DE," ibid. at 270-78, 283-85, 306-307. 
48 Ibid. at 290. 
49 Ibid. at 284-85. 
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DE seeks to give form to this pragmatic experiment through a 
"Madisonian project" of direct deliberation, resting on a "bedrock of respect 
... for diverse, changing understandings of the world, and the contentious 
varieties of individual and group life they inform, as antecedent to and 
protected by the Constitution."50 Associating themselves, on this point, 
anyway, with the civic republican school of thought and with the critical 
legal studies school that preceded it, Dorf and Sabel describe constitutional 
development as an ongoing, argumentative process through which a society 
continually defines and redefines itself along with its priorities and 
aspirations. The democratic experimentalism model reflects an 
understanding of democracy that goes beyond the "thin" liberal sense of the 
term to require active participation from the polity. For modern republicans 
like Dorf and Sabel,51 properly functioning democratic deliberation is an 
ongoing, argumentative process properly characterized not only by a respect 
for individual rights, but also by a strong sense of political participation and 
active citizenship. Democratic experimentalism imagines a collaborative 
method of social problem solving that can only occur through an ongoing, 
open-minded and respectful dialogue between social stakeholders, primarily 
at the level of direct democracy. 
Along with pragmatism and civic republicanism, democratic 
experimentalism can also be located within recent streams of 
critical/deconstructionist thinking on democracy. In particular, democratic 
experimentalism shows the influence of Roberto Mangabeira Unger's 
important (if controversial) work on "radical democracy" as a neo-
Jeffersonian theory of society based on a flexible, plastic structure that 
encourages and assumes constant revision by human agents. Unger points 
out the relevance of underlying institutional structures, what he calls 
"formative contexts,"52 in shaping and limiting peoples' imaginative 
assumptions about the range of options available to them. He criticizes 
existing social democratic norms for insulating their fundamental 
                                                          
50 Ibid. at 289. 
51 See also B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984); J. Cohen, On Democracy: Toward a Transformation of 
American Society (Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1983); F. Michelman, "Symposium: The 
Republican Civic Tradition: Law's Republic" (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1493. For Canadian 
readers: civic republicanism should not be confused with the American Republican political 
party or its platform or with the republican system of government that can be distinguished 
from constitutional monarchies like Canada's. The term refers to the seminal political debate-
-still a crucial one in American political theory--between James Madison's view of 
democracy as a highly participatory civic model based on informed debate among group and 
individual interests within the polity, and Thomas Jefferson's more individualist "libertarian" 
model (which ultimately triumphed among the framers of the American Constitution). 
52 R.M. Unger, Politics: Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) at 130-31. 
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institutions from deep criticism and revision, for overemphasizing 
technocratic solutions to political problems, and for miring the delivery of 
social services in a bureaucratic, procedural ethic that disempowers and 
disengages citizens.53 Unger advocates creating structures that are capable of 
deinsulating aggregated power (both in privileged populations and areas of 
governance) from democratic control. He asserts that a comprehensive 
understanding of citizens' legal rights should include "destabilization rights," 
which would allow citizens to challenge existing hierarchies of power and 
privilege and empower them to prevent factions from gaining a long-term 
hold upon the levers of social power.54 
At the societal level, Unger argues that "false necessities," such as 
entrenched social roles, groups, and hierarchies (including public markers of 
identity such as cultural affiliation, as well as the very distinction between 
public, social, and private spheres of action) also inhibit human freedom, 
creativity, and participation. Moreover, these inhibitors are closely related to 
the structures embedded in a society; in fact, Unger asserts that "group 
alliances and antagonists are always just the reverse side of a set of 
institutional arrangements and a sequence of institutional reforms."55 Unger, 
like democratic experimentalism, asserts that people become more fully 
empowered by breaking down such stable social groups and revising the 
associated institutions and "imaginative contexts" that society, itself, creates. 
Real, legitimate democracy must incorporate deep and direct popular 
participation in governance, meaningful control over processes and 
institutions, and broad-based investment in democratic decision making. It 
requires new forms of human association and far-reaching institutional 
change.56 Ultimately, democratic experimentalism represents such a radical 
democratic shift in decision-making processes and institutions. 
One of the main differences between Unger's theories and civic 
republicanism is that republicanism is prepared to locate deliberation 
anywhere and generally assumes that it takes place in the formal "public 
sphere"--separate and distinct from practical action in the "social sphere" of 
                                                          
53 R.M. Unger, Politics: False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of 
Radical Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 585-86. [hereinafter 
False Necessity]. 
54 Ibid. at 530. 
55 R.M. Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (New York: Verso, 1998) 
at 13. 
56 See R.M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1986) and the three volumes of R.M. Unger, Politics: A Work in Constructive Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also Jonathan Turley's review 
of Unger's program: J. Turley, "Introduction: The Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and 
Deep Thought" (1987) 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. 593. 
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the community and civil society.57 Unger, and by extension democratic 
experimentalism, rejects the distinction between the private, social, and 
public spheres as a self-imposed constraint on human creativity, and he 
advocates a public decision-making model that seamlessly integrates these 
interconnected and equally important facets of individual and group life. 
However, democratic experimentalism also diverges materially from both 
civic republicanism and Unger's elegant theoretical model in one important 
respect: democratic experimentalism sees deliberation as only possible and 
effective when it occurs together with practical action. In this context, the 
introduction of, for example, the best practices standard for participation 
enables democratic experimentalism to avoid the attack on its relevance 
faced by the more theoretical models.58 Democratic experimentalism is very 
much informed by a tradition of progressive social lawyering, which 
emphasizes pragmatic results and values the influence that law can have on 
specific public interest issues.59 Dorf and Sabel recognize that, in its current 
incarnation, democratic experimentalism has yet to provide an entirely 
satisfactory response to, for example, entrenched inequality in society. They 
do not see the problem as a fatal flaw in the model, however, but as an 
ongoing social issue. Because it is well suited to direct, democratic and 
participatory decision making in the complex  and volatile context of 
modern society, they argue that such problems are at a minimum no less 
capable of amelioration through democratic experimentalism than through 
other existing methods of democratic representation.60 
b. Democratic Experimentalism and Constitutional Discourse 
Democratic experimentalism is at its most innovative and most 
challenging in attempting to employ the community-based decision-making 
                                                          
57 H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1977). 
58 Ungerian radical democracy, in particular, is criticized for failing to take seriously the 
rights of minorities and the problem of inequality in real-world societies. Scholars like 
Drucilla Cornell, Cass Sunstein, and Cornel West assert that Unger's vision of the supreme, 
"transcending self" fails to account for different conceptions of human identity that emerge 
from feminist and communitarian jurisprudence, among others. In addition, they argue 
generally that Unger's program is acontextual and exists purely in the realm of the "imagined 
life," to the detriment of its relevance to the important social and political issues that confront 
ordinary people and communities: D. Cornell, "Beyond Tragedy and Complacency"; C.R. 
Sunstein, "Routine and Revolution"; C. West, "Between Dewey and Gramsci: Unger's 
Emancipatory Experimentalism" (1987) 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 693, 869 and 941, respectively. 
59 See, for example, R. Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Nomos and Narrative" 
(1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 9. 
60 "DE," supra note 8 at 408-10. See also Susan Sturm's work on deliberative decision 
making in public remedies, supra note 35, and in workplace discrimination: S. Sturm, "Race, 
Gender and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary 
Observations" (1998) 1 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 639 at 687-88. 
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tools described above to the problem of constitutional rights discourse. 
Employing democratic experimentalism beyond the administrative context 
and into the constitutional one requires that three fundamental elements of 
current constitutional arrangements be re-evaluated: federalism and the 
division of powers, rights discourse, and the role of the courts. 
The impact of democratic experimentalism on federalism can be 
addressed briefly here given the differences between Canadian and 
American federalism in terms of their allocation of responsibilities between 
federal and subnational (state or provincial) units.61 For now, the essential 
point is that under democratic experimentalism, the central government 
actor is relegated to a less pivotal position in public problem solving than it 
holds under traditional models. For example, although the federal 
government (in the United States, Congress) would initiate and perhaps 
finance an experimental social program, the local or municipal government 
(or a community group, or some other subnational decision-making 
structure) would actually do the experimenting based on its determination of 
the priorities and essential community norms that emerge from its own 
experimental process. The national state catalyzes and coordinates local 
activity and sets general guidelines with respect to objectives. It then leaves 
the precise end products to the local bodies' imagination, so long as their 
experimental methods conform to rolling best practice standards of 
participation and decision making. In order to be effective decision-makers, 
however, those subnational institutions must be substantially more flexible 
than many existing governmental structures, and they must be organized 
along the pragmatic, problem-solving lines of the new organizational style. 
In Dorf and Sabel's words, 
these subnational jurisdictions do not have natural boundaries 
to their power. ... For it is only by continually adjusting these 
boundaries that the jurisdictions can, in fact, be effective 
problem solvers. ... [Federalism's] central theme, from the 
vantage point of democratic experimentalism, would no longer 
be the (impossible) search for immovable boundary stones 
marking the limits of federal and state power, but  rather the 
definition of general standards for determining the just and 
                                                          
61 Martha Field, an American scholar, provides a helpful comparative overview of Canadian 
federalism in "The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States" (1992) 55 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 107. The moral foundations of Canadian federalism, in contradistinction to 
the American ones, also have been the subject of some recent attention: see S.V. Laselva, The 
Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of 
Nationhood (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996). The definitive text on the 
structure and operation of Canadian constitutionalism is P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) [hereinafter "Hogg"]; federalism is discussed at 
Chapter 5. 
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effective division of sovereignty with regard to particular 
public problems.62 
As a result, decision making becomes a decentralized, pragmatic, and 
flexible process coordinated loosely through an overarching facilitating 
body, and it is based on notions of community-based norm development and 
direct deliberation. Centralized monitoring for compliance with goals and 
best practices is maintained at the national level, which uses local 
developments as benchmarks to measure and evaluate local practice. 
More directly relevant to present purposes, Dorf and Sabel go on to 
argue that it is not logically possible to limit the implications of democratic 
experimentalism to the structural/procedural aspects of public law, such as 
federalism or administrative decision making. Taken to its logical extension, 
democratic experimentalism must also become a means for translating the 
community's most deeply held beliefs and values (about liberty, democracy, 
rights and equality) into practice. In turn, actually practicing those beliefs at 
the community level, when accompanied by the kind of conscious and 
structured evaluative process they have in mind, will necessarily affect the 
community's understanding of the beliefs themselves. Crucially, in the 
context of the rights discourse that inevitably accompanies public problem 
solving deliberations, the democratic experimentalist process requires that 
the community's norms themselves be open to critical discussion at some 
level. 
Dorf and Sabel readily acknowledge that democratic experimentalism is 
at its most controversial in asserting that fundamental values can safely be 
subjected to this sort of open-ended deliberative process.63 Like civic 
republicanism and philosophical pragmatism, the model introduces a radical 
element of democratic indeterminacy--of experimentalism--into a nation's 
constitutional bedrock. That element seems particularly worrisome in the 
context of a rights discourse that implicates the protection of minority 
interests or the equality of historically disregarded or disadvantaged sectors 
of society. Unlike civic republicanism or philosophical pragmatism, 
however, democratic experimentalism responds by defining and insisting on 
a conscious, self-reflexive decision-making structure, based on rolling best 
practices rule making, to house that conversation about rights. 
The authors make the point that new elaborations on fundamental 
constitutional principles should properly arise from the experimentalist 
process. To begin with, they argue that their model of rights reflects a more 
honest view of what everyone actually means by the word rights in 
                                                          
62 "DE," supra note 8 at 420. Dorf and Sabel discuss American federalism in a more nuanced 
fashion than appears here at 420-38. 
63 Ibid. at 404. 
28 
        39 ALBERTA L. REV. 511 (2001) 
postmodern, post-structuralist thought. Citing a wide range of contemporary 
thinkers, the authors argue that there exists a degree of "awkward 
consensus" in contemporary rights talk.64 This consensus recognizes that 
individual rights (both as concepts and in their contemporary forms) are 
historically contingent constructions that cannot be seen without reference to 
the particular communities within which they are located; but as motivating 
ideals, rights continue to retain their persuasive force. They assert that 
there is agreement that commitments to rights to freedom and 
equality are part of our identity as members of democratic 
societies. Apparently, our rights do not lose their majestic and 
independent authority when we come to acknowledge that in 
some sense we chose them. Because our rights are part of who 
we are, they shape, explicitly or not, all the manifold projects 
by which we determine the future of our polities. Indeed, ... 
given the centrality of rights to our political identity, we 
cannot imagine a future for our polities at all without 
contemplating how we shall affirm or modify our rights.65 
The authors observe that political rights and personhood are mutually 
defining. Citing Joseph Raz,66 they point out that a sort of "feedback loop" 
exists between the individual's definition of herself and her society's 
definition of the possibilities and capacities available to her. In the context 
of rights, the identities and capacities of both the individual and the group 
(or groups) are jointly negotiated and determined.67 Thus the mutual 
recognition of rights is crucial to individual identity, and it serves as an 
approximate political and practical expression of our individual humanity. 
Rights and identity are mutually dependent. 
This historically contextualized and shifting view of rights is consistent 
with the pragmatist nature of democratic experimentalism. In fact, Dorf and 
Sabel argue that socalled "experimentalist rights" are the only rights that we 
                                                          
64 Ibid. at 446-52. Among others, they mention Dworkin, Rawls, Ackerman, Benhabib, 
Gilligan, Walzer, Sandel, Rorty, and Raz. They could probably have included some of the 
Critical Race Theorists as well: see, for example, R. Delgado, "The Ethereal Scholar: Does 
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?"; M. Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: 
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations"; and P. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing 
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights," in (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 323, and 401, 
respectively. 
65 "DE," ibid. at 448. 
66 J. Raz, "Right-Based Moralities" in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984) 182. 
67 "DE," supra note 8 at 448-49. 
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as citizens have or have ever had.68 Democratic experimentalism 
acknowledges that rights are not based on first principles; that inevitably 
they are socially constructed and historically contingent; and that they are 
closely connected with both individual and group identity.69 Allowing a 
community to describe and define rights on its own terms grants explicit 
recognition to an interplay between rights and identity that is taking place 
anyway. Moreover, as a function of this honesty and of its flexible 
principles, democratic experimentalism holds out the potential of 
discovering "new and reconcilable understandings of rights"70 through the 
active and direct discussion it engenders. The authors assert that 
 experimentalism does not name an alternative to the 
identification of Platonic rights. It names an organized, 
considered alternative to a haphazard mixture of metaphysical 
nonsense and ungrounded speculation about empirical 
matters.71 
Further, Dorf and Sabel argue that, thus organized, an open-ended and 
pragmatic deliberative process is an especially effective mechanism for 
talking about constitutional rights and values, both in terms of the results it 
can hope to achieve and in terms of its legitimacy. They assert that 
democratic experimentalism is a "relentless and deliberate application" of 
the liberal faith in the ability of freedom and cooperation to improve the 
human condition: 
Decentralized experimentalism can be an instrument for 
increasing participation, or, put the other way, reducing 
exclusion, and [for] connecting ... to the large hopes of what is 
sometimes called Enlightenment or liberal thought. ... 
Democratic experimentalism by its very nature enlarges the 
range of alternatives under consideration [by] drawing the 
participants beyond the circle of their habits and routines by 
exposing them to unfamiliar projects and prospects.72 
                                                          
68 Ibid. at 452. Here, of course, the general spirit of the article parts ways with some of the 
other thinkers the authors cite. See, in particular, Ronald Dworkin's criticism of philosophical 
pragmatism in R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) c. 4. 
69 "DE," ibid. at 470-73. In doing so, the authors suggest that paradoxes inherent in 
constitutional amendment and deliberation in the United States, which are related to the 
originalist-revisionist debate about constitutional meaning that has attracted so much 
attention in American scholarship, may begin to dissolve through the process of direct 
constitutional deliberation. 
70 Ibid. at 451. 
71 Ibid. at 457. 
72 Ibid. at 405-407. 
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Clearly, these ambitions are well beyond anything contemplated in the 
regulatory and community-based spheres, though they are not beyond the 
ambitions of some European thinkers.73 
Because the most basic rights are at stake in constitutional deliberation, 
Dorf and Sabel ascribe a pivotal role to the courts. In imagining an actual 
mechanism for the intersecting constitutional rights protection with these 
new forms of democratic governance, democratic experimentalism goes 
crucially beyond anything happening in either European or Westminster 
theory. Under democratic experimentalism, courts protect fundamental legal 
norms in two primary ways. First, they are responsible for setting out, at a 
high level of abstraction, the framework of essential rights and values within 
which the democratic experiment is to proceed. For example, a court could 
require that political actors observe the fundamental principles of equal 
protection (as, perhaps, judicial review based on the 14th Amendment does 
in the United States). In articulating the principles upon which the 
discussion must be based, the court ensures that the fundamental 
characteristics of that liberal democratic society are upheld. However, the 
court would not go a step further and set out concrete plans (for example, 
affirmative action programs, school voucher programs, or electoral district 
reform) that translate those values into practice. Each community is free to 
develop means to give effect to the broader value, tailored to its own needs 
and priorities. Thus courts are not forced to pretend that they can imagine all 
the possible real-life consequences of recognizing a particular right or make 
sweeping decisions about which precise mechanism is the most effective 
mechanism for protecting that right.74 
 Second, and equally importantly, courts are the essential instrument for 
ensuring that local political decision-makers observe participatory and 
transparent procedures in their deliberations, thereby avoiding self-dealing 
and enforcing accountability. The whole trajectory of decision making does 
not have to be retraced in the process; rather, the court checks for 
compliance with procedural "best practices." It looks critically at the 
information used by the decision-maker, including its own changing 
responses to challenges and proposed alternatives. The court considers the 
decision-maker's participatory methods, its capacity for evaluating its own 
results, and its capacity for adapting to new information. In the 
constitutional context, then, the court would have to be satisfied that the 
decision-making body had ensured adequate participation for stakeholders, 
including minorities and historically disadvantaged groups. Embedded in the 
                                                          
73 Supra note 37. 
74 "DE," supra note 8 at 388-97. 
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idea of adequate participation are elements of what might be termed 
"procedural due process," including provision of a respectful hearing, due 
notice, and access to information.75 
In scrutinizing the decision-maker's reasoning, courts would have to 
satisfy themselves that the decision-making process had taken into account 
obligatory considerations (such as the affirmative text of a constitution) and 
had ignored impermissible arguments. The decision-maker would also have 
to demonstrate the institutional ability to reflect critically on the results of its 
own and other experiments and other standards of "best practices." Having 
the decision-maker provide reasons for its decisions is important to each of 
these evaluations. In short, the decision-maker would be required to 
demonstrate that it had respected the spirit of legitimate, equal, and dynamic 
deliberation.76 Courts would only defer to the decision-makers' 
experimentalist decisions (for example, to guarantee equal protection in a 
novel manner) once they had been satisfied with the steps the decision-
makers took and the constituencies that participated in developing their 
plan.77 
Dorf and Sabel point out that courts are particularly suited to evaluating 
decision-making processes in a relatively dispassionate way, while leaving 
the nice balancing of competing social interests (an area in which their 
legitimacy is subject to greater attack) to the realm of politics. Moreover, the 
court is not required to speculate ex post facto about justifiable bases for 
implementing the proposed program; the onus is on the decision-maker to 
provide reasons for advocating the policy it does, based on its own 
participatory best practices and benchmarks from other local bodies. 
                                                          
75 It is beyond the scope of democratic experimentalism (and, in fact, incompatible with its 
argument) to lay down a blueprint of exactly how courts could ensure meaningful 
participation; mechanisms would evolve through studied experimentation. But it should be 
pointed out that we know an increasing amount about what "meaningful participation" 
practically entails, and people are talking about it. See, for example, Susan Sturm's work, 
supra note 35. One of the points of this article is that, by their nature, the substantial 
constitutional principles set out in the Quebec Secession Reference also illuminate what 
"procedural due process" in public decision making actually means. See Part III.B.2, below, 
for more on this topic. 
76 "DE," supra note 8 at 388-400. 
77 For an opposing view, see M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univerity Press, 1999). Tushnet argues for a system of populist 
constitutional law within the framework of existing representative democratic institutions. 
Like democratic experimentalism, Tushnet's approach emerges out of the pragmatic and 
civic-republican political traditions. Unlike Dorf and Sabel, however, Tushnet favours 
representative democracy over direct democracy. In addition, he objects to the non-
democratic quality of the judiciary and argues for eliminating constitutional judicial review in 
its entirety. 
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Dorf and Sabel assert that courts can already be seen using this kind of 
analysis in judicial review. Citing cases like Miranda v. Arizona78  and the 
work of David Strauss,79 the authors assert that American courts already 
adopt so-called "prophylactic rules" where they identify conditions that 
threaten constitutional values, without necessarily being able to identify a 
clear violation or to predict the precise causal chain by which that threat will 
come to pass. In those circumstances, courts establish minimum, general 
preventive standards (such as the "Miranda rights" of suspects in the United 
States to discourage coerced confessions following arrest),80 and they then 
encourage other actors with more specific knowledge of the circumstances 
to clarify or improve upon the means by which that rights-protective goal 
can be met. For Dorf and Sabel, such judicial attempts to give effect to 
deeply established but vague constitutional norms, while leaving the means 
of protection open to political experimentation, represents a central role for 
the courts under DE.81 
With these elements of the democratic experimentalist approach in 
hand, I now turn to the next building block in this argument: the 
constitutional situation in Quebec on the question of secession following the 
Supreme Court of Canada's Secession Reference of August 1998. It would 
be surprising to discover that the Court was explicitly aware of the emerging 
scholarship on new forms of governance (although it may well have been 
influenced more subtly by the changing face of public management 
                                                          
78 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
79 D.A. Strauss, "The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules" (1988) 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190. 
80 Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter the Charter] in 1982, s. 10 of which addresses rights on arrest or detention, these 
rights have been accorded constitutional protection in Canada and there has been no need for 
courts to develop analogous prophylactic rules. For non-Canadian readers: the Constitution of 
Canada is composed of two primary documents: the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the 
British North America Act, 1867) and the Constitution Act, 1982. The Charter is part of the 
second document. 
81 "DE," supra note 8 at 452-57. C.R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimism on 
the Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) develops a fairly 
compatible argument within a different terminological framework. Through a discussion of 
the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in the areas of affirmative action, 
discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, the right to die, and issues of free 
speech, Sunstein argues for a particular "democracy-promoting" brand of judicial minimism 
characterized by commitment to a core of constitutional values and the exercise of restraint in 
attempting to turn those core values into ambitious statements or clear, final rules. (In 
Chapter 4, he attempts to lay down the "core" commitments with, likely, greater specificity 
than did the Supreme Court of Canada: see text accompanying note 54.) Sunstein asserts that 
properly exercised, this sort of judicial restraint promotes democracy by leaving issues open 
for democratic deliberation and by promoting reason-giving and accountability in the 
political process. 
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generally in Canada). Nevertheless, in important respects, the Supreme 
Court's decision could be framed as an example of democratic 
experimentalist judging in action: the Court has articulated a framework of 
fundamental constitutional principles within which the question of Quebec's 
secession is to be determined. In its emphasis on a legitimate and respectful 
process of public discourse, it has also required local political decision-
makers to demonstrate that they have observed participatory "best practices" 
in developing a mandate on secession. However, the actual working out of 
the issue is thrown back to the public sphere for resolution. Yet, the 
Secession Reference is more than a convenient ruling on which to hang a 
democratic constitutional experiment in Quebec. The principles it sets out 
are of the very kind that the experiment itself would desperately need: no 
attempt at directly deliberative decision making in a pluralistic society like 
Canada's could afford to do without built-in safeguards for constitutional 
rights and minority protection in particular. In effect, the Secession 
Reference is a stunningly appropriate touchstone for managing the difficult 
balance between constitutional rights and democracy itself, and in this 
respect it makes a significant contribution to the theory of democratic 
experimentalism. 
B. PROPOSING AN EXPERIMENT 
1. QUEBEC AND THE SECESSION REFERENCE 
Democratic experimentalism is a comprehensively imagined model 
supported by concrete examples of its application in isolated administrative 
contexts.82 Similarly, the literature on network governance in the European 
Union is supported by seemingly unmistakable trends from the regulatory 
sphere.83 Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, nowhere have these theories been put 
into actual practice in their most ambitious forms, as mechanisms for 
articulating and developing community-based fundamental constitutional 
norms. Translating a model like democratic experimentalism to the larger 
democratic context is a much riskier proposition than is applying it to the 
local decision-making process. The potential social cost of the change could 
not be taken lightly so long as existing models of constitutionalism, 
democracy, rights discourse, and judicial review continued to function 
relatively well.84 
                                                          
82 The New Public Management, supra note 10 at 19. 
83 Supra note 37. 
84 In fact, the history of new public management and regulatory reform in the United States 
would seem to suggest that some kind of crisis is necessary to catalyze even more modest 
changes in regulatory and administrative structures. As noted above, the crisis in the 
Westminster systems derived from a profound loss of credibility and straitened economic 
circumstances. The crisis in Europe derived from the utter failure of other means for market 
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A chronic crisis exists in Quebec. The last twenty years have seen two 
referendums in that province on the question of secession from Canada (in 
1980 and 1995).85 In addition, the years since the first referendum have been 
characterized by an increasing sense of nationalism and cultural 
distinctiveness on the part of francophone Quebecers. Quebec is, of course, 
a unique francophone-majority culture surrounded by a dominant North 
American anglophone-majority culture. The francophone majority (though 
not monolithic) in many cases traces its roots to the settling of New France 
prior to 1763, and it has a strong sense of a common French heritage and a 
bond to the province's physical territory. The imperative toward la 
survivance of French Canadian culture and language has given rise to a 
series of controversial language laws in Quebec and to an independence 
movement commanding broad-based public support, including support from 
the young and intellectual elites. At the same time, the social, economic, and 
political fabric of Quebec is deeply entwined with that of the rest of Canada. 
Moreover, the face of Quebec is increasingly multicultural, multilingual, 
and globally oriented. Alongside the population that bears francophone 
family names, Quebec (and especially its largest city, Montreal) is home to 
long-standing ethnic and anglophone communities and to a large and 
growing immigrant population (the "allophones") whose first language is 
neither French nor English. Northern Quebec in particular is home to a 
number of increasingly politically active Aboriginal (or "First Nations") 
communities. Multiculturalism is a reality throughout the province, as it is in 
the rest of Canada, and Quebec's philosophical and political thought 
continues to be shaped by the persistent diversity of its society. 
In this context, on October 30, 1995, the separatist government of 
Premier Jacques Parizeau held a referendum in Quebec on the following 
question: 
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after 
having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and 
                                                                                                                                        
integration. Similar crises were the impetus for regulatory changes in environmental law in 
the United States: Backyard Environmentalism, supra note 41. 
85 More accurately, the first referendum was on a question of "sovereignty-association" under 
which the Quebec government sought a mandate to negotiate with Canada for an arrangement 
wherein Quebec would "acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes 
and establish relations abroad ... and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic 
association including a common currency." The Quebec voters rejected that referendum 
question by a majority of 59.5 percent to 40.5 percent. The same two decades have also seen 
two failed attempts on the part of the Canadian government to amend the nation's 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 to 
persuade Quebec to become a signatory to it. The so-called Meech Lake Accord failed to be 
ratified on June 23, 1990; the Charlottetown Accord failed by referendum on October 26, 
1992. See Hogg, supra note 61 at §  5.7. A brief history of Canada's constitutional difficulties 
is available on uni.ca, supra note 5. 
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political partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the 
future of Quebec and the agreement signed on June 12, 
1995?86 
An incredible 94.5% of the eligible population turned out to vote. And 
49.4% of the popular vote answered "yes" to the referendum question. The 
referendum precipitated a political crisis in Canada outside of Quebec, as 
well as in Quebec's anglophone and allophone communities. Canada began 
to wrestle seriously with the unanswered question  of what an affirmative 
vote would have meant for the country. After substantial political wrangling, 
the Canadian federal government brought a constitutional reference87 to the 
Supreme Court of Canada on, inter alia, the following question: "Under the 
Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada 
                                                          
86 The "Bill" referred to, and popularly known, as Bill 1 was actually a draft bill tabled by 
Parizeau in Quebec's National Assembly on December 6, 1994, entitled, An Act respecting 
the sovereignty of Quebec. The "Bill" was endorsed on June 12, 1995, in a Tri-Partite 
Agreement by the then-leaders of the Parti Quebecois, Bloc Quebecois, and Action 
Democratique, Messrs. Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and Mario Dumont respectively. It says, 
among other things, that if the referendum returns a majority affirmative vote, Quebec is 
committed to propose a treaty of economic and political partnership to Canada. The treaty 
would cover many issues, including the free-flow of money, goods, and people between the 
two areas; citizenship; and Quebec's possible use of the Canadian dollar as a monetary unit. 
The Bill states that one year after negotiations are supposed to begin, it will be open to 
Quebec's government to proclaim the national sovereignty of Quebec, irrespective of whether 
the negotiations with the rest of Canada have been successful. The Internet is a good source 
of background information on Quebec sovereignty, Canadian constitutionalism, and the 
referendum. A fairly well-connected (though aging) English web site is Quebec Referendum 
on the Web--1995 Archival Information, online: Internet Sources for Journalists and 
Broadcasters <http://www.synapse.net/-radio/refer.htm> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). 
Uni.ca, supra note 5, is also useful. An exceptional French-language chronology of Quebec 
history is "Chronologie de I'histoire du Quebec" online: 
<http://www.citeweb.net/hist/lien/can-que.html> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). 
87 Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, S-26 gives the Supreme Court of 
Canada the ability--and the obligation--to render advisory opinions on questions referred to it 
by the executive branch of the federal government. The section states that "the Governor in 
Council [i.e., the Parliamentary Cabinet] may refer to the Court for hearing and consideration 
important questions of law or fact" and further, on the making of such a reference, "it is the 
duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to answer each question so referred." The Court 
addressed the constitutional validity of the provision in the Secession Reference, supra note 6 
at paras. 6-15, commenting on the strict "case or controversy" and federal separation of 
powers restrictions in the United States and the European model of abstract constitutional 
review. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the reference provision. It noted that there 
was nothing inherent in the nature of the Court that would prevent it from exercising such a 
role and observed that the Canadian Constitution does not insist on a strict separation of 
powers. The Court went on to find that the questions submitted to it were within the purview 
of s. 53, that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that the questions were justiciable 
(Secession Reference, ibid. at paras. 16-31). 
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unilaterally?"88 The Supreme Court handed down its ruling on August 20, 
1998.89 Nothing done since by either federal90 or provincial91 elected 
                                                          
88 Secession Reference, ibid. at para. 2. Cabinet also asked the Court to determine whether 
international law gave Quebec the right to secede from Canada unilaterally (as a function of a 
possible right to self-determination or otherwise); and, in the event of a conflict between the 
answers provided under domestic and international law, Cabinet asked the Court to determine 
which of the two takes precedence in Canada. The Court denied that Quebec possessed a 
right to secession under the principle of self-determination of people at international law, as 
that principle only applied where "a people" was governed as part of a colonial empire; where 
"a people" was subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where 
"a people" was denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the 
state of which it formed a part. The Court found that none of these conditions applied in 
Quebec on the facts and, therefore, declined to decide whether the Quebec government 
constituted "a people." Because it found no conflict between domestic and international law, 
the Court did not have to decide which of the two would take precedence in Canada (ibid. at 
paras. 109-47). 
89 The government of Quebec refused to take part, stating that the issues at stake were 
political and for the people of Quebec alone to decide. An amicus curiae was appointed to 
put forward a position for Quebec. Shortly after the Secession Reference was initiated but 
before it was heard by the Court, the Canadian Bar Association commissioned two academic 
articles "as contributions to the questions raised." See H. W. MacLauchlan, "Accounting for 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Quebec Secession Reference" (1997) 76 Can. Bar 
Rev. 155, which provides a concise review of the history of the Secession Reference, the 
position of the parties, and the justiciability of the secession question. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the article by R. Howse & A. Malkin, "Canadians are a Sovereign People: How the 
Supreme Court Should Approach the Reference on Quebec Secession" (1997) Can. Bar Rev. 
186, makes fascinating reading with respect to the normative bases on which the Court could 
address the problem before it. 
90 Bill C-20 became An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 2d Sess., 36th 
Parl., 2000 (assented to 29 June 2000, S.C. 2000, c.26). This ordinary statute commonly 
known as the Clarity Act provides that, should a provincial government officially release a 
referendum question that it intends to submit to its voters relating to proposed secession from 
Canada, the Canadian House of Commons shall consider the question and set out its 
determination as to whether that question is "clear." In doing so, the House of Commons shall 
consider "whether the question would result in a clear expression of the will of the population 
of a province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada and become an 
independent state." This clear expression explicitly cannot result from two kinds of 
referendum question: one that would only seek a mandate to negotiate with the rest of Canada 
without soliciting a direct expression on secession itself; or one that "envisages other 
possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or 
political arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the 
population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada." The 
Clarity Act states that the government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on 
secession if it determines that the referendum question is not clear (s. 1). In addition, 
following any such referendum, the government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations 
on secession unless it determines that there has been "a clear expression of the will of a clear 
majority of that province in favour of secession." Criteria for defining the "clear majority" 
include the size of the majority in favour of secession, the percentage of eligible voters who 
took part in the referendum, and anything else that the House of Commons considers relevant 
(s. 2). The statute also insists a province's secession from Canada would require an 
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representatives has served to settle the debate about Quebec's future with the 
rest of Canada.92 
After deciding that neither jurisdictional limitations nor the allegedly 
non-justiciable nature of the issues barred it from accepting the reference,93 
the Court addressed the relevant historical bases, written and unwritten, of 
Canada's constitutional architecture. It formulated its ruling on the question 
of secession by reference to what it found to be four fundamental organizing 
principles that informed and sustained the Canadian constitution: federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for 
                                                                                                                                        
amendment to the Canadian Constitution; and that no minister of the Crown shall propose 
such an amendment "unless the Government of Canada has addressed, in its negotiations, the 
terms of secession that are relevant in the circumstances, including the division of assets and 
liabilities, any changes to the borders of the province, the rights, interests and territorial 
claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority rights" (s. 3). 
91 Quebec's response to the Clarity Act was Bill 99, which became An Act respecting the 
exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec 
State, 1st Sess., 36th Leg. Quebec, 2000 (assented to December 13, 2000), S.C. 2000, c. 46. 
The Quebec Act's Preamble describes the Clarity Act as a federal legislative initiative "that 
challenge[s] the legitimacy, integrity and valid operation of [Quebec's] national democratic 
institutions." It states that "the Quebec people is the holder of rights that are universally 
recognized under the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," and that 
"the Quebec people alone, acting through its own political institutions, has the right to decide 
the nature, scope and mode of exercise of its right to self-determination." It describes a 
winning vote on a referendum to be "fifty percent of the votes cast plus one" (Chapter I). 
Among other noteworthy provisions, the statute goes on to affirm Quebec's sovereignty over 
the whole of its territory (in Chapters II and III) and states that "no other parliament or 
government may reduce the powers, authority, sovereignty or legitimacy of the National 
Assembly" (Chapter IV). On May 5, 2001, a small anglophone political party in Quebec, the 
Equality Party, brought an action in Quebec Superior Court seeking to have portions of the 
Act declared unconstitutional; the petitioners' motion is available online: 
<http://www.vigile.net/01-5/henderson.html> (date accessed: 25 August 2001). See also G. 
Wanamaker, "Quebec hauled into court" CNEWS Politics (17 May 2001), online: 
<http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWSPolitics0105/17_wanamaker-can.html> (date accessed: 25 
August 2001). 
92 It is, moreover, a fundamental assumption of this article that separatist sentiment in Quebec 
is a long-standing historical phenomenon, not the product of an individual politician or party. 
Lucien Bouchard, until recently the separatist Premier of Quebec and head of the Parti 
Quebecois, resigned on January 11, 2001, citing the independence movement's lack of 
success. F. Tomesco, "Quebec's Bouchard Quits, Citing Separatism's Failings" Bloomberg 
(11 January 2001), online: Bloomberg 
<http://quote.bloomberg.com/newsarchive/wnarchive.cgi> (date accessed: 14 August 2001). 
While this move robbed the Parti of one of its most charismatic personalities, I argue that 
Quebec's internal division and its frustration with Canadian federalism has not evaporated 
with his departure. The province's new premier, Bernard Landry, recently expressed his 
"profound wish" to hold another election on the question of sovereignty before 2005. See R. 
Seguin, "Landry sees new vote on sovereignty by 2005" Globe and Mail (20 August 2001) 
A1. 
93 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at paras. 4-31. 
38 
        39 ALBERTA L. REV. 511 (2001) 
minorities.94 The Court stated that no single principle could be defined in 
isolation from the others; nor did any one principle trump or exclude the 
operation of any other.95 
With respect to "federalism," the Court found that the adoption of a 
federal form of government was an essential act of nation building for 
Canada, without which the agreement of the various (now provincial) actors 
could not have been obtained. Federalism is "the political mechanism by 
which diversity could be reconciled with unity," "a political and legal 
response to underlying social and political realities," and a crucial 
recognition of "the diversity of the component parts of Confederation, and 
the autonomy of provincial governments to develop their societies within 
their respective spheres of jurisdiction."96 The federal system allows citizens 
to express themselves in a variety of forums, at both regional and national 
levels.97 
The Court stated that democracy, in the sense of the "supremacy of the 
sovereign will of a people," is a fundamental value in Canadian 
constitutional law and political culture that implies more than mere majority 
rule.98 It stated: 
Democracy is not simply concerned with the process of 
government. On the contrary ... democracy is fundamentally 
connected to substantive goals, most importantly, the 
promotion of self-government. Democracy accommodates 
cultural and group identities... Put another way, a sovereign 
people exercise its right to self-government through the 
democratic process. In considering the scope and purpose of 
                                                          
94 What follows is a review of the principles of the Secession Reference tailored to my 
particular argument. The Secession Reference has, of course, attracted a great deal of 
outstanding analysis already. See, for example D. Schneiderman, The Quebec Decision: 
Perspectives On The Supreme Court Ruling On Secession (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1999); P. 
Monahan, "The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession 
Reference" (1999) 11 N.J.C.L. 65; S. LaSelva, "Divided Houses: Secession and 
Constitutional Faith in Canada and the United States" (1999) 23 Vermont L. Rev. 771; J-F. 
Geaudreault-DesBiens, "The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial Arbitration of 
Conflicting Narratives About Law, Democracy and Identity" (1999) 23 Vermont L. Rev. 793; 
and (1998) 10:1 Const. L. Forum, which is an issue devoted to the Quebec Secession 
Reference. 
95 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at para. 49. 
96 Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in 
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, sets out the division of powers between the federal and 
provincial governments respectively. 
97 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at paras. 35-47, 55-60. 
98 Ibid. at para. 61. 
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the Charter, the Court in R. v. Oakes . . . articulated some of 
the values inherent in the notion of democracy: 
"The Court must be guided by the values and 
principles essential to a free and democratic 
society which I believe to embody, to name but a 
few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person, commitment to social justice and 
equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, 
and faith in social and political institutions which 
enhance the participation of individuals and 
groups in society."99 
 With respect to the third principle, "constitutionalism and the rule of 
law," the Court drew on a series of its significant constitutional references 
taken over the last twenty years to conclude that the rule of law is a "highly 
textured" concept. Most basically, it implies that there is one law for all; that 
an actual order of positive laws that preserves and embodies the more 
general principle of normative order must be created and maintained; and 
that the relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated 
by law.100 The rule of law provides the framework within which the people's 
sovereign will is to be ascertained and implemented. In turn, that legal 
system derives its legitimacy from its accountability to the democratic 
will.101 Augmenting the rule of law, the principle of constitutionalism 
provides that all government action must be in accordance with the 
Constitution, which is the "supreme law of Canada" and the source of 
legitimate government authority in the federation. In addition to providing 
for the division of political power in the federalist system, the Constitution 
is entrenched beyond the reach of simple majority rule in order to ensure 
                                                          
99 Ibid. at para. 64 [footnotes omitted]. Interestingly, the Court is broadening significantly the 
plain meaning of the term "democracy" by reference to R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. The 
Oakes case was, in fact, a relatively early post-patriation constitutional case that set down the 
above description of the "free and democratic society" (which presumably implies more than 
the simple "democratic society") in a particular factual matrix: the Court was construing the 
meaning of section 1 of the Charter, which states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 
Whether the Court would have described the free and democratic society in the same terms 
were it construing a rights-enabling clause, rather than a rights-restricting one, is not clear. In 
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 Dickson C.J. commented that the notion of the "free and 
democratic society" is the commonality that "links the guarantee of rights and freedoms to 
their limitation." 
100 Secession Reference, ibid. at paras. 70-71. 
101 Ibid. at paras. 66-67. 
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that fundamental human rights and freedoms are respected and that 
vulnerable minority groups are protected.102 
The Court was least expansive on the meaning of the fourth (and already 
vague) animating principle of Canadian constitutionalism, "respect for 
minorities." It observed that in practice, the protection of minorities has 
often been the product of historical political compromises, with the result 
that provisions for minorities in Canada have been oriented toward 
according religious, educational, and linguistic rights to cultural and 
linguistic minorities in particular. In addition, the three other constitutional 
principles have also "inform[ed and sometimes presumably limited] the 
scope and operation of the specific provisions that protect the rights of 
minorities." Nevertheless, the Court asserted that the broader principle of 
respect for minorities is the product of a tradition "at least as old as Canada 
itself," and it is an independent organizing principle of the constitutional 
order. The Court linked respect for minorities with the principle of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law only by reference to three incarnations 
of the principle: the explicit individual rights provisions set out in the 
Charter; the historical statutory provisions respecting minority rights in the 
areas of language, religion, and education; and the protection of the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, which "whether looked at in their own right or as part of 
the larger concern with minorities, reflects an important underlying 
constitutional value."103 
The subtle ways in which the Court interconnects the other animating 
principles helps to explain what is meant by "respect for minorities." Setting 
out the connections requires quoting from the judgment at some length. To 
begin with, democracy is related to the federalism principle in that 
federalism allows the sovereign will of the people to be expressed 
concurrently in different collectivities. The federal structure also facilitates 
democratic participation by distributing power to the government most 
suited to dealing with a given social objective.104 Those different 
collectivities, however, also play a role in protecting minority rights: 
                                                          
102 Ibid. at paras. 72-74. Louis Henkin sets out a set of "essential characteristics of 
constitutionalism" in rather broader terms. Along with the protection of individual human 
rights, Henkin's formulation, paraphrased, also subsumes: the rule of law (including judicial 
constitutional review); a higher standard for constitutional amendments than the simple 
majority; the existence of an independent judiciary; the separation of powers; limited 
government; popular sovereignty and accountable democratic government; and civilian 
control of the police and the military. L. Henkin, "Elements of Constitutionalism" Occasional 
Paper Series, Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University (1992). 
103 Secession Reference, ibid. at paras. 79-82. Beyond its articulation of the above historical 
rights and the rights of Aboriginal peoples, the Court does not attempt to set out how a 
"minority" is to be identified. See Part III.B.2, below, for more on this topic. 
104 Ibid. at para. 58. 
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The principle of federalism facilitates the pursuit of collective 
goals by cultural and linguistic minorities which form the 
majority within a particular province. This is the case in 
Quebec, where the majority of the population is French-
speaking, and which possesses a distinct culture. This is not 
merely the result of chance. The social and demographic 
reality of Quebec explains the existence of the province of 
Quebec as a political unit and indeed, was one of the essential 
reasons for establishing a federal structure for the Canadian 
union in 1867... The federal structure adopted at Confederation 
enabled French-speaking Canadians to form a numerical 
majority in the province of Quebec, and so exercise the 
considerable provincial powers conferred by the Constitution 
Act, 1867 in such a way as to promote their language and 
culture. It also made provision for certain guaranteed 
representation within the federal Parliament itself.105 
The principle of respect for minorities also reconciles the theoretical 
tension between constitutionalism and democracy. The Constitution, 
including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is entrenched 
beyond the reach of simple majority rule precisely because respect for 
minorities is essential to, rather than in conflict with, the "richer" principle 
of democracy that informs the Canadian system:106 
[A] constitution may provide an added safeguard for 
fundamental human rights and individual freedoms which 
might otherwise be susceptible to government interference. 
Although democratic government is generally solicitous of 
those rights, there are occasions when the majority will be 
tempted to ignore fundamental rights in order to accomplish 
collective goals more easily or effectively. Constitutional 
entrenchment ensures that those rights will be given due 
regard and protection. Second, a constitution may seek to 
ensure that vulnerable minority groups are endowed with the 
institutions and rights necessary to maintain and promote their 
identities against the assimilative pressures of the majority.107 
Finally, each of the organizing principles is held together through a 
"rich" practice of democracy, characterized by full and effective 
participation of all groups in society; an assortment of forums in which 
groups as well as individuals can pursue their interests; and a government 
                                                          
105 Ibid. at para. 59 [emphasis added]. 
106 Ibid. at paras. 74-78. 
107 Ibid. at para. 74 [emphasis added]. 
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structure that is accountable to the expression of the sovereign will as so 
defined. The goal of the democratic process is not simply to determine the 
will of the majority or to enforce consensus. The Court described 
democracy, rather, as an ongoing process of respectful and pragmatic public 
deliberation, negotiation, argument, and collaboration through which society 
continues to define and examine itself and its goals: 
[A] functioning democracy requires a continuous process of 
discussion. The Constitution mandates government by 
democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to them, 
'resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion and 
the interplay of ideas' ... At both the federal and provincial 
level, by its very nature, the need to build majorities 
necessitates compromise, negotiation, and deliberation. No 
one has a monopoly on truth, and our system is predicated on 
the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best solutions to 
public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably, there will be 
dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is 
committed to considering those dissenting voices, and seeking 
to acknowledge and address those voices in the laws by which 
all in the community must live.108 
In the final analysis, the Court applied the four constitutional principles 
to the secession context and held that there, too, an obligation to negotiate 
existed. It concluded that any effort on the part of Quebec to secede from 
Canada must derive its legitimacy from the clear expression of a democratic 
will to so do. Therefore, a "clear majority" vote by the people of Quebec on 
a "clear referendum question" in favour of secession would be necessary. 
Such a vote would require the other provinces and the federal government to 
enter into negotiations with Quebec.109 Those obligations would be 
reciprocal, such that neither Quebec nor the rest of Canada could dictate 
terms to the other. Further, the democratic principle expressed in the 
secession vote, while accorded due respect, would have to be tempered by 
due consideration for the other constitutional values.110 Significantly, the 
Court described "a 'clear' majority as a qualitative evaluation"111 and 
pointed out that 
                                                          
108 Ibid. at para. 68 [footnote omitted]. 
109 Ibid. at paras. 87-88. 
110 Ibid. at paras. 85-88. See also generally paras. 89-105. 
111 Ibid. at para. 87 [emphasis added]. It must be pointed out that the Court sets out the need 
for a qualitative majority only once in the judgment. It does not define the term apart from 
saying that "the referendum result, if it is to be taken as an expression of the democratic will, 
must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it 
achieves." Nevertheless, I have made the concept of a clear qualitative majority--as opposed 
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the other provinces and the federal government would have no 
basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue 
secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec 
choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the 
rights of others. ... Negotiations would need to address the 
interests of the other provinces, the federal government, 
Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within and 
outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities. 
The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of 
various rights and obligations by negotiation between two 
legitimate majorities, namely, the majority of the population of 
Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole. A political majority at 
either level that does not act in accordance with the underlying 
constitutional principles we have mentioned puts at risk the 
legitimacy of its exercise of its rights.112 
The Court warned that such negotiations would be exceedingly difficult, 
that no one could predict the course of them, that there could be no 
guarantee of success in the negotiations, and that even in the event of a clear 
majority vote in Quebec on a clear question, there was no absolute legal 
entitlement to secession. The Court also referred, obliquely, to the 
possibility that the provincial boundaries of Quebec could be challenged in 
the secession context.113 Ultimately, however, the Court acknowledged the 
political nature of the process. It stated that in defining the precise nature of 
the obligation to negotiate, it was confronted with "the difficult inter-
relationship between substantive obligations flowing from the Constitution 
and questions of judicial competence and restraint in supervising or 
                                                                                                                                        
to a quantitative majority, no matter how large--central to my argument because it seems to 
capture, in a word, a sense of the broad range of considerations that the Court insists must be 
evident in a legitimate, broad-based, and inclusive constitutional democratic process. In 
particular, the Court's discussion of the democratic principle in the Secession Reference (ibid. 
at paras. 63-69) informs my understanding of the term "qualitative." 
112 Ibid. at paras. 151-52. As noted above, the Secession Reference obviously deals with the 
negotiation procedure between Canada and Quebec; however, my focus continues to be on 
developing a framework for constitutional deliberation within Quebec, using the principles 
set out in the Secession Reference as guidelines. 
113 Ibid. at para. 96. The possibility that Quebec itself could be divided in the event of a "yes" 
vote is an exceptionally charged political issue in Canada. This so-called "Plan B" was raised 
publicly by Prime Minister Jean Chretien shortly after the 1995 referendum, to the great 
alarm of both federalists and sovereigntists in Quebec (as well as many people in the rest of 
Canada). 
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enforcing those obligations."114 It left the precise articulation of those 
constitutional obligations to the negotiating parties themselves, should the 
need ever arise. 
2. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALIST JUDGING 
A strong case can be made that the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling on 
the Secession Reference illustrates the principles of democratic 
experimentalist judging in action. This is not to suggest that the Court 
literally or consciously saw itself as a player in a new kind of governance, 
though it may have been familiar with the broad themes of new public 
management models. Nevertheless, the Court's judgment can be cast into the 
courts' role of protecting fundamental legal norms, as Dorf and Sabel have 
envisioned it. Specifically, the Supreme Court has articulated, in general 
terms, those essential substantive rights and values that delimit the 
boundaries within which the democratic negotiation should proceed: 
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for 
minorities. The Court does not, however, attempt to prescribe a precise 
mechanism by which those organizing principles should be made manifest, 
much less what they require in the context of a Canada-Quebec negotiation 
on secession. Nor does the Court attempt to prescribe the conclusive "proof" 
the Quebec government would require to demonstrate that it was reflecting 
the will of a "qualitative clear majority" of its people, should it demand 
negotiations with Canada. For example, the Court deliberately refuses to set 
out what percentage of the popular vote would satisfy its threshold 
legitimacy requirement. It also leaves open what degree of demonstrated 
respect for rights, the rule of law, and minorities are required or how those 
prerequisites will be established. In addition, it openly acknowledges that it 
is in no position to imagine the possible consequences of a clear affirmative 
vote in favour of secession--beyond the requirement for a negotiation with 
Canada--or to predict the course of those negotiations. 
Second, in describing the Constitution's animating principles as it has, 
the Court has moved a substantial distance toward developing a framework 
for the actual process of the secessionist deliberations. The principles the 
Court sets out--and the principles of democracy, respect for minorities, and 
the clear qualitative majority in particular--are the standard by which 
Quebec's deliberative process will be judged. In effect, the Court is saying 
that it is prepared to defer to the elected representatives of Quebec (and to 
require the Canadian government to negotiate with those representatives) to 
the extent that they can demonstrate that a responsible, democratic, and 
broadly participatory process within Quebec has given them a secessionist 
mandate. Quebec must show that its mandate is accountable to the popular 
                                                          
114 Ibid. at para. 89. See also generally paras. 85-105. 
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will and that it was achieved within the bounds of "obligatory 
considerations," such as the rule of law and the text of the Canadian 
Constitution (including those individual rights fundamental to the smooth 
operation of the democratic machinery, such as freedom of speech and 
association). It must demonstrate adherence to an ongoing negotiative 
process and to substantive outcomes emanating from that process that 
ensure adequate participation and protection for social and political 
stakeholders, including minorities and other historically disadvantaged 
groups such as women. Quebec must develop its democratic mandate 
through a process of "compromise, negotiation, and deliberation" that, by 
definition, acknowledges that there is no "monopoly on truth."115 Thus 
deliberation and participation must be "rolling," in democratic 
experimentalism language, in that the process requires the Quebec 
government to respond to challenges and actively consider other models and 
proposed alternatives that emerge from the public discussion. 
Third, as is appropriate in serious constitutional discourse, the Court has 
allocated political and judicial roles in a way that balances democratic 
pressures with the protective mechanisms that constitutional rights require in 
any pluralistic and unequal society. The Court's emphasis on a highly 
participatory and open-ended deliberative method recommends it to a 
situation in which fundamental questions going to Quebec's very identity are 
at stake. The method also seems better-suited to the difficult task of reaching 
an accommodation between the many different constituencies in Quebec 
society than does a one-time yes/no vote or an attempt to impose an artificial 
consensus. The judgment recognizes that democratic process is the essential 
source of constitutional legitimacy. However, in constructing the Secession 
Reference as it has, the Court has reserved to the judiciary the equally 
crucial function of constitutional judicial review, to ensure that the majority 
will respects the principles of Canadian constitutionalism and does not do 
violence to the rights of minorities. In setting the goal of the process at the 
level of the "clear qualitative majority" the Court is mandating a democratic 
process that demonstrably protects local cultures and autonomy, reconciles 
unity with diversity, and provides for minorities' self-determination while 
safeguarding democracy.116 
In order for the Secession Reference judgment to have "bite" in the real 
world, courts, governments, and society must have some meaningful way of 
evaluating whether Quebec's deliberative process is actually meeting the 
standards established. This is, of course, one of the motivating sentiments 
                                                          
115 Ibid. at para. 68. 
116 Ibid., particularly at paras. 59, 64, 74. 
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behind the Canadian federal government's Clarity Act.117 My argument here 
is that new public management theory and democratic experimentalism 
provide more appropriate tools--rolling best practices rule making, 
benchmarking, systematized learning--for evaluating that process. In the 
Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada has described the rights-
protective and process-protective role that courts must play to transform 
new public management structures into something like a democratic 
constitutional experiment.118 With these counterpoised democratic and 
constitutionalist foundations in place, a procedural structure to support a 
respectful and accountable social argument becomes an imaginative 
possibility. 
The ultimate question about democratic experimentalism, however, 
comes down to whether one believes that it can actually coexist with the 
kind of balancing that all pluralist and unequal societies must carry out in 
                                                          
117 Supra note 90. The Act's preamble states that "the Supreme Court of Canada has 
determined that the result of a referendum on the secession of a province from Canada must 
be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it 
achieves ... and that a qualitative evaluation is required to determine whether a clear majority 
in favour of secession exists." The preamble concludes that "it is incumbent on the 
Government of Canada not to enter into negotiations that might lead to the secession of a 
province from Canada, and that could consequently entail the termination of citizenship and 
other rights that Canadian citizens resident in the province enjoy as full participants in 
Canada, unless the population of that province has clearly expressed its democratic will that 
the province secede from Canada." 
118 A speculative example may be helpful to illustrate the courts' role under the Secession 
Reference and democratic experimentalism. Lower courts would still have the responsibility 
for ensuring that the animating constitutional principles set out by the Supreme Court of 
Canada continue to define the field on which any deliberations occur. In the event of dispute 
the court's role would be to satisfy itself, based on evidence provided by the parties, that 
participants were observing legitimate deliberative processes and that the substantive goals 
they advocate do not undermine the deep norms set out by the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
lower courts could operate in essentially the same way (albeit with different tools) that they 
do when reviewing the conduct of administrative tribunals for their adherence to standards of 
due process and natural justice. Because the democratic experimentalist process produces its 
own measures, reasons, and internal standards, however, courts would have better access to 
the kind of hard factual evidence that makes for solid judgments. Groups that can establish 
their ability to abide by legitimate participatory practices, reflect on their own experience, 
and learn from others' will earn greater deference from the courts. As Dorf and Sabel point 
out, this sort of rigorous fact-based analysis is exactly what judges are trained to do, and they 
are particularly well-suited to the role when the general principles at stake are legal ones 
relating to federal structures, constitutional norms, and the rule of law. Litigation aside, it 
may also be that the legal profession has a special role to play in democratic experiments of 
this nature. Professor Sturm argues that by virtue of their training, lawyers are in a unique 
position to anticipate issues; to link aspirational constitutional norms with actual 
organizational practice and goals; and to help participants understand and apply those values, 
familiar to law, of fairness, participation, reasoned decision making, and principled conduct. 
S. Sturm, "From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, 
the Academy, and the Legal Profession" (1997) 4 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 119. 
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the interest of constitutional rights and social fairness. This is hardly a 
problem that is unique to Canada: the disjuncture between constitutional 
values and democratic ones is an old and familiar source of worry, perhaps 
especially in the United States.119 The larger debate is obviously beyond the 
scope of this article, which restricts itself to the question of democratic 
experimentalism's compatibility with Canadian history, society, and 
constitutional values. But Canada has a relatively long history of managing 
social diversity, cultural pluralism, and official bilingualism. Its experience 
has also given rise to an exceptionally sophisticated national conversation 
about identity, rights, and democracy. For these reasons, the Canadian 
situation makes a unique and valuable contribution to the larger debate 
taking place in North America, Europe, Westminster, and elsewhere. The 
position I take is that democratic experimentalist methods can be sensitive 
to the Canadian tradition of granting explicit recognition to minority groups, 
as well as individuals, and that there is nothing in the Secession Reference 
that would contraindicate applying a DE-style fluid deliberative model. On 
the contrary, the model may hold out substantial promise as a way of 
managing the tension between group and individual rights in Canada. 
Moreover, the understanding of constitutional federalism and the "clear 
qualitative majority" that emerges in the Secession Reference makes an 
important contribution to democratic experimentalism itself.120 
C. EQUALITY AND RESPECT FOR MINORITIES 
In the experimentalist democracy imagined by Dorf and Sabel, proper 
decision-making bodies are decentralized, fragmented, and fluid 
organizations, focused on solving discrete problems and reaching pragmatic 
goals. The assumption is that, apart from creating better-equipped, more 
                                                          
119 Most recently see F. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). I would argue that at least some of the worries that are expressed 
about democratic experimentalism actually boil down to general worries about democracy, 
writ large. Some others seem to derive from the fact that democratic experimentalism puts 
difficult questions about identity and social choices squarely on the table in the expectation 
that they can be more legitimately and effectively dealt with through open democratic 
deliberation than through less transparent and less explicit or less intentional means. 
120 I do not want to underemphasize this point. In its pure form Ungerian radical democracy 
seriously underestimates the impact of power dynamics and of the self-reproduction of 
exclusionary social groups on the emergence of flexible new forms of democracy. To a lesser 
degree, democratic experimentalism attracts the same criticism. For this reason Canadian-
style recognition of group allegiances seems to me to offer an essential, perhaps even 
indispensable, additional dimension. I agree with Michael Ignatieff, who recently argued that 
Canada's evolving "civic nationalist" rights culture, which has emerged in the last thirty years 
as a distinctive product of Canada's multicultural, multilingual history and its national 
struggle to reconcile unity with diversity, makes a particularly important contribution to 
rights talk in this regard. M. Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: Anansi, 2000). 
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effective decision-making bodies, this model increases the circle of 
democratic participation and multiplies the opportunities available to 
citizens to act in the public sphere. The further assumption is that such 
groups would actually come to value diversity in their membership as a 
means of discovering new options and developing better solutions in their 
decision making. Two important requirements, however, are that the groups 
remain fluid and that the interests they represent not become entrenched. 
The negotiation and deliberation process could not be a log-rolling or pie-
dividing endeavour among long-established constituencies. Seen from this 
perspective, one of the assumptions of democratic experimentalism is that 
individual liberty is best protected through a process that prevents 
entrenched groups from having a permanent say in the deliberations. 
For the Supreme Court of Canada, by contrast, a proper deliberative 
process has to take place within a context that expressly respects distinct 
minorities. It is, frankly, not clear what the Court has in mind by the term 
"respect for minorities." Whether out of necessity given the difficulty of 
setting out the contours of the concept or out of deference to the political 
nature of the constitutional problem, the Court has refused to define its 
meaning with any specificity. Certainly, we do not know from the text of the 
judgment what it is to "respect" a minority or even what it is (as the Court 
expresses the concept elsewhere) to "accommodate"121 or "protect"122 
minorities. In its most explicit reference to the actual values it has in mind, 
the Court refers to the constitutional aim of ensuring that 
vulnerable minority groups are endowed with the institutions 
and rights necessary to maintain and promote their identities 
against the assimilative pressures of the majority.123 
We are not told whether those groups attract constitutional protection 
because they are vulnerable; because historically they were ignored or 
actively mistreated; because they have collective identities that (for any 
number of reasons) should be maintained and promoted; because 
assimilation into the majority of the polis is in itself a bad thing (again for 
any number of reasons); or simply because all numerical minorities attract 
some degree of constitutional protection.124 The Court's clear focus on 
                                                          
121 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at paras. 44, 48, 64. 
122 Ibid. at paras. 38, 46, 79, 80. 
123 Ibid. at para. 74. 
124 The Court's own views on minority protection under the Charter have been set out fairly 
specifically in the last fifteen years, particularly through litigation under the equality 
provisions contained in s. 15 of that document. These cases are instructive. However, the 
Secession Reference discussion focuses on principle, not precedent. It would be very bold to 
suggest that those Charter precedents had generated a comprehensive and conclusive rule 
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cultural and linguistic minorities and the religious, educational, and 
language rights accorded them in the past suggests a genealogical element to 
the principle--that either historical disadvantage or perhaps the importance 
of a particular minority group (such as French Canadians) in historic 
constitutional negotiations is relevant. Whether other kinds of minorities 
(for example, minorities as defined by their sexual orientation) are entitled 
to the same protection does not attract explicit comment. Similarly, there is 
no reference to the status of women, the poor, or other groups who 
historically were not accorded the same levels of "respect" in the political 
process as more privileged groups, but who may not, strictly speaking, be 
minorities. On the other hand, the fact that the Court steadily refuses to set 
out who the minorities in question actually are undoubtedly says something 
important about what it is trying to accomplish. Deciding whether the 
Supreme Court's understanding of respect for minorities is compatible with 
democratic experimentalism must, therefore, come down partly to 
interpretation. 
The Secession Reference does embody certain general beliefs about 
respect for minorities. To begin with, it is clear that the Court does not see 
an inherent conflict (or at least not an irreconcilable one) between protecting 
traditional liberal individual rights and the "respect for minorities" principle; 
references to "individual and minority rights" are sprinkled throughout the 
Secession Reference. The same linkage demonstrates the Court's desire to 
articulate this defining constitutional principle in the familiar language of 
rights. The "principle of minority rights" continues to resonate with the 
Court in spite of the acknowledged fact that the shape of minority rights in 
Canada is uncertain and, to the extent known, is the path-dependent product 
of identifiable past compromises. Moreover, the Court's identification of 
some broader principle of respect for minorities in Canadian 
constitutionalism suggests that the categories of minorities actually entitled 
to respect are not limited to those that have already negotiated them or that 
have been recognized as having them. The Court's view mirrors the 
"awkward consensus"125 described by Dorf and Sabel in observing that, even 
though minority rights protections in Canada clearly are the product of 
historical political compromises, this does not mean that they are 
"unprincipled."126 Yet the Court is not engaged in a Hegelian process of 
"discovering" the innate reason behind the law; nor, as seems clear by its 
terms, can the Secession Reference be reduced to a positivist list of what 
rules have acquired the status of rights conventions to be followed for that 
                                                                                                                                        
book on how to respect minorities here, in the context of a political discussion, on secession, 
in Quebec. 
125 "DE," supra note 63. 
126 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at para. 80. 
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reason alone. Rather, it seems to be saying that historical provisions for 
minorities reflect a recognition of an important idea of rights, whose 
recognition ought to (and whose definition then will have to) continue into 
the future. 
Interestingly, the Court also makes repeated, seemingly offhand 
reference to cultural and group identities.127 Despite the casual form of the 
commentary, it at least suggests the important point that cultural or group 
membership is, in some unspecified way, tied into some kind of group 
identity. In the context of the Secession Reference and the language-based 
issues in Quebec, however, that identity should not be seen to be tied to an 
immutable characteristic shared by group members; language, to take the 
obvious example, is not immutable. Group membership is neither an 
unshakeable, singular foundation of identity for group members, nor a rigid 
determinant of the options available in seeking an accommodation with and 
within the larger group. Cultural or group membership is only one factor in 
the structure of Canadian constitutionalism; the Supreme Court does not 
suggest that Canadian citizens can be understood exclusively and 
conclusively as "members of this family or community or nation or people, 
as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic."128 The principle of 
respect for minorities is not permitted to trump the other fundamental 
principles of federalism, democracy, and constitutionalism and the rule of 
law. The goal cannot be to entrench protections of group rights at the 
expense of those other principles that ensure a multi-forum government 
structure, an accountable and representative state, the protection of 
individual rights, and the expression of the sovereign will--or to entrench 
any of those principles at the expense of the others. Thus the "respect for 
minorities" principle cannot be boiled down entirely to a recognition that 
cultural and linguistic associations are crucial elements of identity, although 
this is definitely part of the mix. 
On the other hand, although they are not monolithic, minority groups 
are seen to be distinct from the polity generally, at least in their broad 
outlines, and entitled to some level of respect by virtue of that differentness. 
The political model described by the Court is not so much a pure civic-
republican model as it is a model of multicultural citizenship along the lines 
variously described by Canadian writers like Will Kymlicka, James Tully, 
and Charles Taylor.129 For Taylor, subnational group memberships, 
                                                          
127 For example, see supra, text accompanying note 103. 
128 M.J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self" (1984) 12 Political 
Theory 81 at 86. 
129 The term "multicultural citizenship" is Kymlicka's, and on a general level it is a good 
descriptor. However, I do not mean to suggest that Taylor, Tully, and Kymlicka share a 
common approach to all aspects of rights and citizenship. Taylor, in particular, places greater 
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including cultural and linguistic associations, are central and abiding 
components of our largely socially determined identities. As a result, a 
presumption of equal recognition and respect for such associations is 
necessary to ensuring full and equal personhood for everyone in the properly 
functioning democratic polity.130 For writers like Kymlicka, one of the 
reasons that collective rights and cultural survival mechanisms are important 
is because they affect the substance (and not just the exercise) of individual 
liberal rights: members of some vulnerable communities will not be able to 
exercise meaningful choice if they are deprived of the "cultural structures" 
that give those choices their person-specific content.131 In the result, a 
comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state is understood to 
actually require both universal rights for all and certain group-differentiated 
rights for minority cultures as a function of full citizenship.132 
Significantly, the multicultural citizenship model asserts that there is 
more to protecting minority communities than "leveling the playing field" to 
ensure that individuals in those groups are not less able to exercise their 
individual civil rights than members of the majority. It wants to protect 
                                                                                                                                        
emphasis on the sources of personal identity in group membership, and although he expresses 
admiration for his writing, he does not believe that Kymlicka's ideas necessarily go far 
enough: C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in A. Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 
[hereinafter "Taylor"]. For his part, Kymlicka has expressed some discomfort with what he 
sees to be the communitarian strains in Taylor's writing: see, for example, W. Kymlicka, 
Liberalism, Community and Culture (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 2-3 [hereinafter 
"Kymlicka"]. See also J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). My assertion is simply that their views are 
consistent to the extent described in the paragraph above. Americans and others who also 
recognize some role for social and/or group recognition in the public deliberative process 
include Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Martha Minow, Yael Tamir, and 
Jurgen Habermas. Joseph Raz also argues that group rights are often a precondition of 
individual rights: J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994) at 193-216. John Rawls, himself, has probably moved closer to this perspective in 
acknowledging the possible existence of "a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines": J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993) at xvi. I am not suggesting that there is a national consensus in either country 
about what rights mean, nor am I attempting to set up some sort of essential juxtaposition of 
"Canadian" and "American" perspectives. As noted above, the purpose here is more discrete: 
this is a preliminary attempt to determine whether a particular theoretical model of 
democratic deliberation can help to make sense of the Quebec Secession Reference and the 
democratic process it contemplates, bearing in mind some of the more significant features of 
Canadian society and constitutionalism. 
130 Taylor, ibid. at 29-36. See also C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of Modern 
Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
131 Kymlicka, supra note 129 at 165. 
132 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 6. 
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those minority communities for their own sake. As the Court does in the 
Secession Reference, multicultural citizenship models actively invite 
communities to "promote" their own language and culture.133 In employing 
this model, the Supreme Court of Canada is working from within a model of 
democratic deliberation that expressly acknowledges the polyethnic, 
heterogeneous nature of Quebec and Canada, and--here, pulling most clearly 
away from the civic-republican school--of those groups' relevance to the 
sphere of public deliberation. And indeed, when addressing the possible 
secession from Canada of a culturally and linguistically distinct subgroup, it 
is difficult to imagine how the Court could validly have done anything else. 
The assertion that comes out of the Secession Reference is that the 
democratic process must respect those aspects of minority affiliation that are 
important to the minority individuals' status as full citizens in the political 
process. It is significant that the Court has linked together individual and 
group rights in the Secession Reference and that it has grounded its 
discussion on the notion of respect. Real civic engagement with the 
democratic process is essential not only to the protection of individual 
rights, but also to full personhood because it is only through interaction with 
others that one's identity as an individual becomes shaped and one's rights 
acquire content. Political engagement is an important aspect of that public, 
social, and personal identity. Both the Secession Reference and democratic 
experimentalism refer repeatedly to notions of "self-government" and "self-
determination" as crucial elements of true democracy--but in this context, 
self-determination means not only giving a group the social, public, and 
cognitive space to create its own future, but it also means giving it the space 
to define for itself what it essentially is in the present and in the context of 
the problem to be solved.134 Public and equal recognition of a group's self-
defined essential elements, along the very axes in which they matter (for 
example, recognizing language rights in contexts like public education) is 
the essence of respect and of full and meaningful participation in a rich 
democratic process.135 Yet those group characteristics must struggle to 
coexist with individual rights, the rule of law, and the spirit of open and 
respectful democratic deliberation.136 
                                                          
133 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at para. 74. 
134 "Self-determination" in this context is not a term of art as it is used in international law. 
See, for example, H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: the 
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 
at 44. 
135 The concept of equal respect as the unifying force between notions of equality and liberty 
derives from J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980). 
136 The related question of how a liberal democracy ought to deal with illiberal values or 
practices on the part of minority groups in its midst has attracted a great deal of attention. An 
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 Returning to democratic experimentalism, one recalls Dorf and Sabel's 
condition that social roles, groups, and hierarchies not become entrenched 
so that the democratic process can operate effectively. Disentrenching stable 
social groups does not mean denying that group membership matters to 
individual identity, democracy, or justice. I do not read Dorf and Sabel to be 
suggesting that deeply deliberative democracy requires individuals to 
bargain away central, socially-derived constituents of their identities; on the 
contrary, they recognize the relationship between rights and both individual 
and group identity. Nor are they claiming that individuals are infinitely 
mutable, free-floating units without unique perspectives that derive from 
their own lived experiences and social ties. If this were the claim, then 
diversity and broad, intersectoral participation would not be the valued and 
central parts of the democratic experimentalism model that they are. 
Moreover, democratic experimentalism does not suggest that group 
affiliations are not meaningful social constructs. The model is concerned 
with reducing exclusion and increasing social connection to a deeply 
representative and democratic process. No model can operate with these 
goals without noticing the ways in which membership in particular groups 
affects the opportunities, expectations, self-understanding, and perceived 
capacities of its members. To pretend that group-based stereotypes, on one 
hand, and tightly knit community networks, on the other, do not matter to 
individuals' connection to public deliberation is not reasonable, and it is not 
consistent with DE. In truth, rigidly denying the relevance of social groups 
and roles would be as inconsistent with democratic experimentalism as 
actually entrenching groups would be because both positions arbitrarily limit 
the range of possibilities that can be imagined for realizing social goals. 
                                                                                                                                        
interesting recent approach to squaring a commitment to substantial liberal values with a 
recognition of cultural pluralism has been put forward by A. Bilgrami, "The Philosophy of 
Rights and Cultural Identity" (School of International and Public Affairs Lecture, Columbia 
University, 3 November 1999) [unpublished]. He argues that liberal doctrine should not 
retreat to founding its doctrine on some minimal shared ground that even illiberal 
particularisms might share. It can insist on the full and substantial liberalism it is committed 
to, while at the same time holding out the hope that illiberal elements in various communities 
within its citizenry might be brought around to these full substantive liberal commitments by 
giving them arguments that appeal to values within the other commitments of those 
communities. Consistent with my position here, Bilgrami presupposes that as a matter of 
empirical fact, there is always room to find some internal tension (or potential tension), even 
within those who hold illiberal commitments. Thus pluralistic liberalism on this view does 
not mean that illiberal practices must inevitably be tolerated. It also does not mean that 
liberals should follow the traditional approach of simply making a priori arguments that all 
"rational people" are somehow bound to accept. Rather, it means that liberals may strive to 
bring others around to liberal practices by giving arguments that might be very different in 
each case, thereby appealing to different internal tensions in different illiberal communities. 
To this comment I would add that the process is a dialogue, and it is always open to minority 
communities to counter an insistent liberal position with further arguments, including 
arguments based on liberalism's own commitments to equal respect. 
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What democratic experimentalism contests is the notion that stable 
social groups should be permitted to entrench their roles in the deliberations, 
to hoard authority and limit others' access to the forum, to foreclose internal 
debate or external challenge, and to insulate themselves from change. 
Democratic experimentalism questions the ability of any group legitimately 
to speak for all of its members, on every issue, across time and space. It 
denies that there can be any unshakeable group-based "way to be" that can 
prescribe and predict individual potential in every respect. It denies that all 
public conversations between groups set up in opposition to each other have 
predetermined results, that there is never any room to move. Democratic 
experimentalism recognizes that important group identities, while they are 
entitled to space and respect, are nonetheless complicated and contestable.137 
Recognizing the integral elements of individual and group identity is an 
important task for any society. Imagining ways to square group membership 
with belonging to a larger community is important not only to individual 
identity, but also to developing common goals that can improve the lot of 
each. Democratic experimentalism asserts that defining and reaching those 
common goals is best achieved through continuous and respectful 
democratic deliberation, which recognizes both individual and group rights--
and provides mechanisms for keeping those constructs moving and fluid. 
When seen in these terms, there are large and useful zones of 
compatibility between the democratic experimentalist model and 
multicultural notions of citizenship. Significantly, both are informed by the 
belief that individual citizens contain within themselves overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting layers of identity and allegiance, several of which 
may be entitled to respect and recognition at once. Thus one can be 
simultaneously an individual, a lawyer, a francophone, a mother, a 
Montrealer, and an Indo-Canadian.138 Each of those shorthand labels is 
likely, to varying degrees, to be significant to one's identity and deserving of 
respect; however, they will almost certainly never sum up to a perfectly 
consistent and predictable political decision-making unit on every issue. Nor 
                                                          
137 See M. Minow, Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics and the Law (New York: New 
Press, 1997) at 34-46, who has commented on the tendency, in group-based analysis, to 
reduce complex individuals to one identifying trait and then to imagine that they can be 
described for all purposes along that axis. There is also the related tendency to neglect 
intersectionality--the fact that all individuals are members of multiple groups to some degree-
-and there are problems with what Professor Minow calls group "boundaries, coherence, and 
content." She points out that real-world group identities are blurry, fluid and contestable; to 
describe them otherwise is to do violence to the full personhood of its members. On the 
problem of essentialism, see also A. Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory" (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581. 
138 I disagree with those who see this as unfortunate or dangerous. See, for example, R. 
Gwyn, Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1995). 
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should such imagined integrity be imposed; political decision-making 
structures should not be designed to force citizens to represent themselves in 
unidimensional, essentialized terms. In addition, multicultural citizenship 
models and democratic experimentalism both imagine true democracy as a 
continuous process of debate, negotiation, and collaboration through which 
goals are defined and problems are addressed pragmatically, within a 
general framework of rights and rules but without reference to fixed first 
principles. Both recognize that rights are central to political identity, and 
both accord moral weight to the reciprocal relationship between rights 
(including recognition) and identity, in spite of the path-dependent quality of 
any particular articulation of those rights. In addition, both value rather than 
discourage diversity within the policy, not only for its ability to bring new 
perspectives to the decision-making forum but also in its own right on 
personal, social, and public levels. Thus, I argue, both democratic 
experimentalism and multicultural citizenship theory hold in common the 
principles of democracy, respect for minorities, and individual rights 
protection (embedded in the idea of constitutionalism and the rule of law), 
described as the animating constitutional principles of Canada. 
The Secession Reference also describes federalism as a pillar of 
Canadian constitutionalism and the "lodestar by which the courts have been 
guided" from the beginning of Confederation.139 The definition of 
federalism developed in the Secession Reference represents a careful 
response to the demands of Canadian diversity and multicultural citizenship, 
as a structure that allows citizens to express themselves as individuals in a 
variety of different collectivities, accompanied by a public declaration of 
respect for minorities that makes space for expressing important group-
based commitments. The result is an approach to democratic experimentalist 
governance that actively seeks to recognize social pluralism and that admits 
of a more complicated understanding of both collective and personal sources 
of individual identity. Dorf and Sabel point out that in order to be 
representative, a democracy should be based on flexible, overlapping, 
negotiable decision-making units that reflect the shifting nature of personal 
identity and political commitments. On this level, then, Canadian federalism 
is a model that is equipped to create, within a diverse and dynamic society, 
the kind of responsive and inclusive constitutional process to which 
democratic experimentalism aspires.140 
                                                          
139 Secession Reference, supra note 6 at para. 56. 
140 In fact, integrating democratic experimentalism with federalism on the multicultural 
model--that is, with federalism used as a means of dealing with pluralism--brings out a 
further set of synergies between the two. The topic is the subject of another paper entitled 
"Flexibility Good and Bad: Directions and Disagreements for Canadian Federalism" 
[unpublished] in which I argue that federalism continues to provide the best model for 
managing cultural pluralism in Canada, fascinating new constructions of "network 
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One important caveat exists: within the larger project, special thought 
would have to be given to Aboriginal peoples and the province's northern 
regions. Geographic isolation, small and culturally relatively homogenous 
communities, potential cynicism about the usefulness of "white" or 
"southern" methods, and the longstanding socio-economic marginalization 
of many northern communities will generate a host of special concerns in 
those regions. Compounding this is the fact that First Nations communities 
have strong reasons to remain part of Canada,141 given the federal 
government's historical fiduciary duty toward First Nations and, arguably, 
their concerns about the extent to which an independent Quebec would 
assume those responsibilities. In moral, historical, and legal terms, the 
position of Aboriginal nations vis-a-vis the Crown is undeniably different, 
and that difference must be taken seriously. Emphatically, the Aboriginal 
perspective on an independent Quebec must be given due regard, and the 
democratic experiment may be expected to take a rather different path in 
Quebec's northern regions; however, this is not a reason to assume that this 
deliberative project cannot or need not operate there. Difficult and complex 
problems are best approached through smaller, concrete steps, and comfort 
and facility can increase through experience. Flexible and democratic 
deliberative methods can be useful tools for moving the public debate 
forward, in the north as elsewhere. 
More optimistically, it should be remembered that Aboriginal peoples 
do not stand only to lose through democratic experimentation. Problems of 
geography, access, and resources are not insoluble. In fact, Aboriginal 
peoples' geographic concentration in regions such as Nord-du-Quebec and 
Cote Nord may have a positive aspect, in that the Aboriginal perspective 
                                                                                                                                        
governance" and other post-statist theories notwithstanding. 
141 The Aboriginal peoples of Quebec are divided into 10 nations and 41 communities 
including the Cree, Mohawk, Huron and Montagnais and Attikamek, in addition to the Inuit 
from Ungava and the Innu from Labrador. The tone of their response to the referendum 
process differs according to whether they are French or English-speaking. However, many 
are strongly opposed to an independent Quebec and the Cree in particular consider secession 
an illegal violation of native rights. The Cree, Inuit, and Innu peoples held their own 
referendums on secession on October 27, 1995, on the question of whether they wanted their 
people and traditional territory to be associated with an eventual independent Quebec. The 
votes respectively were 96 percent, 95 percent and 99 percent against. The positions of the 
Grand Council of the Crees and the Innu are set out on their nations' web sites, online: 
Grande Council of the Crees <http://www.gcc.ca/PoliticalIssues/secession/secession.htm> 
(date accessed: 13 August 2001); "Declaration des Innu sur la Separation du Quebec, online: 
Innu Nation <http://www.innu.ca/sepyqb1.html> (date accessed: 13 August 2001). Mativik, 
the organization representing the Inuit people of Nunavik at the time of the referendum, no 
longer posts their pre-1996 press releases online; however they are available on the uni.ca 
homepage, online: <http://www.uni.ca/makivik_prs.html> (date accessed: 25 August 2001). 
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will very much guide local deliberations taking place in those regions. This 
situation echoes one of the advantages that the Supreme Court of Canada 
perceives to flow from federalism, that of ensuring identifiable minority 
communities gain access to adequate representation by forming majorities at 
a more local level. Aboriginal experience with more consensual forms of 
social decision making, and with thinking about novel kinds of self-
determination may also make Aboriginal peoples particularly valuable 
contributors to the province-wide debate. Particularly, combined with the 
ongoing negotiations between Quebec, Canada, and Aboriginal peoples 
about self-determination, it may even be that having access to this kind of 
participatory and responsive process will go some distance toward renewing 
those peoples' faith in the political process. Perhaps most importantly, a 
well-functioning experimentalist process may throw up wholly new ideas, 
more satisfactory than the status quo to all concerned, about how to structure 
Aboriginal peoples' relationships with Quebec and Canada.142 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE QUALITATIVE CLEAR MAJORITY 
This article represents a first attempt at consciously marrying direct 
democratic deliberation with the enforcement of important constitutional 
norms, in the context of a real-life policy question and across the boundaries 
of national legal traditions. It is an ambitious goal. However, the exercise of 
thinking about it is worthwhile for a number of reasons. 
The most obvious reason for entertaining a new approach is that 
Canadian federalism is troubled and may benefit from the injection of fresh 
ideas. Constitutional problems are not only the stuff of ivory tower debate; 
in profound and pervasive ways they affect the shape of our public spaces, 
                                                          
142 The Court's discussion of Aboriginal peoples in the Secession Reference is vague indeed, 
although it emphasizes the importance of Canada's obligation to Aboriginal peoples. It is 
possible that that obligation may be understood in terms other than that of a fiduciary 
relationship between Canada and Aboriginal peoples. In conversation on November 9, 1999, 
Professor Sabel raised the interesting possibility that the idea of a fiduciary relationship is a 
"prophylactic rule," or in DE parlance, it is an example of courts setting minimum, general 
preventive standards to give effect to deeply established but vague constitutional norms. 
When seen in these terms, the fiduciary construct is only one historically-contingent and 
negotiable means of recognizing Canada's special relationship with its First Nations peoples. 
It is open to the polity, through democratic and responsible means, to come up with other 
options for meeting the same obligations. Those options may include, for example, various 
incarnations of self-government along the lines pursued in British Columbia with the Nisga'a 
Nation and others. The terms of the Secession Reference would probably require negotiations 
between Canada, Quebec, and the Aboriginal nations in question in this context as well. The 
suggestion is reminiscent of Kirsty Gover's and Natalie Baird's observations about the New 
Zealand situation, supra note 18, and in fact traces of a more negotiable, open-ended 
Crown/First Nations relationship may already be at play in the narrower context of the "duty 
to consult" in Canada: see S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: 
Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252. 
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our societies, and our public conversation. Unresolved antagonisms and the 
apparent inevitability of unsatisfactory arrangements take a toll on public 
confidence and social resilience, bleeding energy and resources from other 
productive spheres of activity. The upside is that used well, constitutional 
structures are the working link between the challenges of real-world 
governance and a society's deepest aspirational ideals. Healthy societies 
need to take their national constitutional structures seriously and explore all 
the options available to them. Thus even if non-Canadian constitutional 
models may seem unlikely sources of inspiration, other perspectives ought 
to receive honest and careful consideration before being rejected out of 
hand.143 
Second, Canada has a unique contribution to make to the transnational 
conversations about governance that are taking place. Its experience in 
applying new public management models in a variety of public and social 
contexts is an important component of Westminster and North American 
understandings of public sector reform. More profoundly, Canada's 
experience with democracy, cultural pluralism, and social compromise is 
rich and relatively long. That history has given rise to a sophisticated 
national body of thought that can offer substantial refinements to what I 
argue are essentially compatible new governance models being developed 
elsewhere. Moreover, the Secession Reference itself may raise the bar for 
democratic constitutionalism. One of the basic characteristics of modern 
constitutions is that they may not be amended by simple majority vote. In 
this context, the Supreme Court's notion of the "clear qualitative majority" 
agreement, infused with the principles of federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities, represents 
an innovative definition of the more-than-simple-majority that runs along 
substantive, as well as numerical, axes. The "clear qualitative majority" 
suggests a democratic process with a moral claim to legitimacy that extends 
beyond any particular issue and beyond Canada's own experiences with 
constitutional decision making. 
                                                          
143 Sujit Choudhry makes a compelling argument for comparative jurisprudence in 
constitutional interpretation in S. Choudhry, "Globalization in Search of Justification: 
Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation" (1999) 74 Ind. L.J. 819. He 
reviews theoretical models and the actual interpretive methodologies and normative 
justifications used by courts in several countries (including the United States, South Africa, 
and Canada) in the process of judicial review. He also considers the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of the three models he identifies: the universalist, the genealogical, and the dialogical. 
Incidentally, his review of Canadian cases on Aboriginal rights leads him to conclude that the 
Canadian method is primarily genealogical. I would argue that the methodology of the 
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Third, it is not the least virtue of democratic experimentalism that it puts 
hard questions about democracy and constitutionalism firmly and explicitly 
on the table. The model is valuable in the Quebec context because, without 
downplaying the magnitude of the issues, it imagines law as a positive tool 
for creative, collective action. For Quebec, the secession debate is one 
manifestation of larger questions about identity and aspirations that it (at 
least as much as every other nation) faces in a globalizing and ever more 
complicated world. These are political, social, moral, and literally 
"constitutional" questions--not just legal ones. Democratic experimentalism 
represents an organized, conscious, democratic and yet essentially pragmatic 
approach to them. It is an attempt to engage all the public, civic, and 
cognitive resources the society possesses in the service of responding to 
those questions. Moreover, it sees citizens as subjects, not objects, capable 
of imagining and building a more fulfilling and effective public life. If a 
consensus cannot be reached through a process as legitimate and 
accountable as this one tries to be (or as this one can be as modified by its 
own continuous institutional learning) then one may be hard pressed to 
blame the process. 
 The truth is that there are no guarantees that a clear qualitative majority 
would emerge from a true democratic experiment in Quebec. The ultimate 
outcome may be that the province will discover its identity to be a messy 
one that resists being fenced in by tidy, "clear questions." 144 The advantage 
to the piecemeal method proposed here is that it ought to be possible 
nevertheless to identify a core of shared values that can be reflected in 
Quebec's relationship to the rest of Canada, without having to corral the 
entire range of public sentiment on every issue. While substantial and 
continuing disagreement within Quebec is a less than utopian outcome, it 
would not mean that the process had failed. A respectful deliberative 
process has value in itself. Moreover, federal democratic structures are 
designed expressly to accommodate messy, volatile identities on an ongoing 
basis. In the end, the experiment imagined at the beginning of this article 
may boil down to an exercise in understanding just that. 
The Secession Reference rightly draws on Canada's rich constitutional 
traditions of democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and the protection of 
minorities in thinking about Quebec's relationship to the rest of the country. 
To this we might add the Canadian history of compromise and a desire for 
peace, order, and good government. In the end, however, both constitutional 
principles and theoretical constitutional models are of limited value if they 
                                                          
144 This observation has been made about Israel, described as torn between an identity as a 
"state of the Jewish people" and as a "secular state for all its citizens": G.J. Jacobsohn, Apple 
of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
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do not have the opportunity to play themselves out in the real world. If 
Canada's constitutional qualities are to be anything more than aspirational, 
Quebec's secession debate will require something more than a winner-take-
all, yes/no vote on a question determined by elected representatives. 
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